Post Second World War British foreign policy in the Middle East,
Case study: “the Suez Crisis 1956”

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DEDICATION:

First and for most all thanks and praise to God the most gracious and
Merciful for strength and encouragement, and for being
Always beside me.

I want sincerely to dedicate this research project to:

The memory of

My loving mother Houria

My father Mohammed

My brothers: Yacin, Nadhir and Hocine

My sisters: Fouzia, Houda and her daughter Rania

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ABSTRACT

Right after the end of the Second World War, the world knew important and dramatic turmoils. The Suez Crisis 1956, was undeniably one of the most serious events of that era which irrevocably changed the history of the entire Middle East as well as the history of the world, because it ushered in new powers regionally and changed the world order globally.

This dissertation aims at analyzing different elements of British foreign policy in the context of the Suez crisis, 1956, starting with a brief analysis of the origins and evolution of Anglo-Egyptian relations. Then, the emergence of the new Egyptian regime under the Free Officers in 1952 and a deep insight in the policies and circumstances which were to pave the way to the crisis. Focus in this work is on the impact of the Suez crisis on the new superpower the United State and Soviet Union, Israeli, Egypt, Britain, and France.
Introduction

The Suez Crisis of 1956 was among the most important events of the Cold War era; which caused a deep conflict within the Western alliance. The crisis had many dimensions of which the change in status of the ancient imperial powers in the area was perhaps the most important. The crisis was a turning point in the modern history of the Middle East as well as in the campaign of decolonization which swept the Third World after that. The nationalization of the Anglo-French owned Suez Company was not the only cause of the tripartite invasion in Egypt in October 1956. Other factors, indeed, played a significant role like, the Cold War, Arab Nationalism, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the attempt of the old imperial powers to preserve their status in and hegemony on the area. It begin with the end of second world war (1939-1945), especially when Egyptian president Jamal Abed Nasser declared to nationalize Suez canal on 26 July 1956. The ostensible reason for nationalization was to use the tools to finance the building of Aswan dam but in the fact Nasser’s action was an act for revenge against British and France who had previously held controlled the canal and this later led to conflict precipitated an international crises over ownership and operation of Suez canal and all that for many reasons for instance: the attack of tripartite aggression was primarily to regain western control of the canal and precipitate the fall of Nasser from power also the Suez canal instantly became strategically important, it provided the shortest ocean link between Mediterranean and the Indian ocean. the canal eased commerce for trading nation and particularly helped European colonial as well as it considered as conduct for shipment of oil. etc….

Statement of problem

The Present study concerns the political and historical circumstances and result of the Suez crisis on Egypt, Britain, and superpower in same the time it highlight the relations between Anglo-Egyptian and Franco-Egypt after and before Suez crisis.
**Research question**

The present dissertation will answer the following research questions:

1. what were the circumstances of the 1956 in the Middle East/world?
2. what was the degree of success or failure of British’s policies to maintain their imperial policy over Egypt?
3. what were the effects and after math of Suez crisis?

**Significants of the study**

This research is important because it highlight the British foreign policy between duplicity and diplomacy and other western-middle east relations. The reader can understand the main factors and circumstances that led to change the M.E area in this period following the Suez Canal crisis.

**Methodology**

This research will be based on data collected from the library and internet. Throughout this research, we will carry out the descriptive analytical method.

**Literary review**

The Suez Canal was subject for way attitudes previously, for instance (William.R.Patterson & David Wilby).briefly the Suez crisis, referred to a tripartite and, it was an offensive war fought by France, the united kingdom, and Israel against Egypt beginning on October 29, 1956 .Therefore, and by virtue of William .R.patterson: we find that The Suez Crisis began on July 26, 1956 when Egypt’s President, Jamal Abdel Nasser took the action of nationalizing the Suez Canal. This was a direct challenge to British strategic control in the Middle Eastern region. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 had granted the British a
lease over the canal and the British had a sizeable troop Presence there until 1954 when they agreed to withdraw most of them. The French were also concerned with the nationalization of the canal since they believed it would strengthen Nasser’s influence over their North African colonies. Israel was also worried that the hostile Egyptians would interfere with their shipping rights through the canal. In response to Nasser’s action, the British, French and Israelis held a secret meeting to plan retaliation. It was decided that Israel would invade Egypt and attempt to gain control of the Sinai Peninsula. The British and French would then intervene as a ‘peacekeeping’ force and demand that Israeli and Egyptian forces each withdraw from the canal, all that to participate in hostility against Egypt and control on Suez canal……….. in other hand we find David Wilby who supported William’s idea when he said that:

Suez was the biggest crisis Britain had faced since the Second World War. It began when Egypt’s President Nasser nationalized the Anglo-French Suez Canal Company in July 1956. In retaliation, Britain and France secretly supported an Israeli invasion of the Sinai Peninsula. London and Paris then offered to intervene and set up a buffer zone between Israel and Egypt, but when that was refused, on 31 October 1956, their troops went in and took over the Canal Zone. The crisis escalated when the Soviet Union offered its support to Egypt. As this was during the Cold War, the United States wanted to stop any expansion of Soviet influence. So it put pressure on Britain and France to pull out, which they did in November………….
CHAPTER ONE

The historical background of the Suez Canal Crisis
Introduction

Britain’s Foreign Policy toward Egypt went into different stages throughout the Nineteenth Century up to the Nationalization of the Suez Canal that was the last provocation made by Colonel Nasser challenging Britain’s status in the Middle East. Britain was among the most influencing players in the Middle East during that period, only France and the Ottoman Empire challenged its role in the area. France sign the Entente Cordiale and recognize Britain’s role in Egypt, whereas the Ottoman Empire fell after the First World War leaving Britain as the major power there. Post Second World War relations, however, changed the Situation mainly due to the emergence of two new superpowers, the USA and The USSR, and the economic and political instability that Britain was facing when trying to preserve its old possessions. The Suez Crisis came to indicate that Britain was no, more able to do so without the help and the assistance of the USA.

The First stage was historical state of Suez Canal and the harsh competition with France over Egypt throughout the nineteenth when Britain succeeded in invading Egypt in 1882 ended by the signature of the Entente Cordiale up to the Great War when Egypt officially was declared as a protectorate. The second stage was the period between the two Wars when Britain did its best to preserve Egypt though its economic troubles at home by signing the Anglo- Egyptian Treaty 1936. This period ended when the Free Officers movement undertook the Coup d’état of 1952. The Third stage was from the coup up to the nationalization of the Suez Canal when the signature of the base agreement of 1954 proved to be a failure for Britain to undermine President Nasser ’s policies.
1.1-Suez Canal’s Historical Setting

The Suez Canal, connecting the Mediterranean and the Red seas, The Suez Canal is often called the “crossroads to Europe, Africa, and Asia” because the route is used to transport goods to and from all three continents , (figure 1) ( Dowling.(2011):pp 1) and it inaugurated in an elaborate ceremony attended by French Empress Eugenie, wife of Napoleon III.

In 1854, Ferdinand de Lesseps, the former French consul to Cairo, secured an agreement with the Ottoman governor of Egypt to build a canal 100 miles across the Isthmus of Suez. An international team of engineers drew up a construction plan, and in 1856 "the Suez Canal Company was formed and granted the right to operate the canal for 99 years after completion of the work". Construction began in April 1859 and at first" digging was done by hand with picks and shovels wielded by forced laborers". Later, European workers with dredgers and steam shovels arrived. Labor disputes and a cholera epidemic slowed construction, and the Suez Canal was not completed until 1869--four years behind schedule. On November 17, 1869, the Suez Canal was opened to navigation. Ferdinand de Lesseps would later attempt, unsuccessfully, to build a canal across the Isthmus of Panama. (Varble. (2003): pp 9.10)

When it opened, "the Suez Canal was only 25 feet deep, 72 feet wide at the bottom, and 200 to 300 feet wide at the surface". Consequently, fewer than 500 ships navigated it in its first full year of operation. Major improvements began in 1876, however, and the canal soon grew into the one of the world's most heavily traveled shipping lanes. In 1875, Great Britain became the largest shareholder in the Suez Canal Company when it bought up the stock of the new Ottoman governor of Egypt. Seven years later, in 1882, Britain invaded Egypt, beginning a long occupation of the country. The Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 made
Egypt virtually independent, but Britain reserved rights for the protection of the canal. (Roger (2010):pp10-27.)

After World War II, Egypt pressed for evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone, and in July 1956 Egyptian President Jamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the canal, hoping to charge tolls that would pay for construction of a massive dam on the Nile River. In response, Israel invaded in late October, and British and French troops landed in early November, occupying the Canal Zone. Under pressure from the United Nations, Britain and France withdrew in December, and Israeli forces departed in March 1957. That month, Egypt took control of the canal and reopened it to commercial shipping.

Ten years later, Egypt shut down the canal again following the Six Day War and Israel's occupation of the Sinai Peninsula. For the next eight years, the Suez Canal, which separates the Sinai from the rest of Egypt, existed as the front line between the Egyptian and Israeli armies. In 1975, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat reopened the Suez Canal as a gesture of peace after talks with Israel. Today, an average of 50 ships navigates the canal daily, carrying more than 300 million tons of goods a year. (Simmon. (2010), pp 2-12).
Figure 1: the Suez Canal as crossroad from Europe to Asia and Africa

(Klapholz. (2013): pp 12)

1.2-British imperialism policy in Egypt from 1800 to 1941

EGYPT WAS the ‘swing door’ of the British Empire. Lying on the Isthmus of Suez, Egypt controlled the shortest overland route from Britain to British India, the Far Eastern
possessions and the Australian continent. Command of the isthmus by a hostile power would have endangered Britain’s control of these imperial possessions. With the loss of the American colonies in 1783, Britain’s eastern Empire, centered on India, greatly increased in importance to it. Napoleon illustrated the centrality of Egypt to British power with his ambitious attempt to capture it and the overland route to India in 1798. While the bid to seize control of the overland route floundered due to Nelson’s victory at the Battle of the Nile, it caused near panic in ministerial circles in London. Throughout the nineteenth century, it remained a source of concern to British statesmen, who feared the growing French influence in the eastern Mediterranean.

Egypt was nominally a part of the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century as it had been for over 500 years. However, in reality, it was increasingly independent under a succession of powerful Khedives (viceroys). The Khedives were reformist, and sought to transform their country into an industrialized society with the aid of European expertise and finance, partly to increase Egypt’s independence from Constantinople. The centerpiece of this industrialization programmed was the building of a canal along the Isthmus of Suez by a French company between 1859 and 1869. Allowing ships to sail through Egypt directly, the canal dramatically increased the strategic significance of Egypt to Britain. Moreover, the modernization of Egypt was paid for by enormous loans from French and British bankers, which the Egyptian government found increasingly difficult to service. British investment was driven by the fear that the growing French financial and political influence over Egypt could not go unchallenged for fear that they would gain control over the canal route. In 1875, Benjamin Disraeli, the British Prime Minister, took the opportunity offered by Egypt’s need for liquidity to buy, for the British government, the Khedive Ismail’s (1863–79) 44 per cent share of the Suez Canal Company. Again the main objective of this purchase was to prevent
the French gaining exclusive control. *The Times* commented that: ‘We have now an abiding stake in the security and welfare of Egypt.

However, Disraeli’s injection of liquidity failed to solve the huge financial problems of the Khedive. The European powers, led by France and Britain, imposed a financial settlement, on Khedive Tawfig (1879–92), which saw two thirds of the revenue of Egypt going to service the enormous foreign debt which it had accumulated. By 1881, the financial pressure was becoming too much to bear for an increasingly disaffected Egyptian army which had not been paid for months. In September of that year, a senior officer, Arabi Pasha, carried out a *coup d’état* and made himself Minister for War. Fearing that the Egyptians might default on the huge loans that British and French capital had poured into Egypt and the inability of the Egyptians to protect foreign citizens, the British Prime Minister, William Ewart Gladstone, deployed naval forces to Alexandria in a show of force. Initially the expedition was supposed to be a joint effort with the French. Indeed an Anglo-French joint note was issued in January 1882 as support for the Khedive against Arabi. However, the French withdrew from the proposed mission, letting the British deal with the crisis alone. In May 1882 a naval force was sent to Egypt. This had the effect of inciting anti-foreign feeling leading to riots in Alexandria which left 50 Europeans and 170 Egyptians dead. On 10 July 1882, after rejecting a British ultimatum to disarm forts around the city, the Royal Navy bombarded Alexandria. The bombardment only served to increase the disorder and anarchy in Egypt as well as further threatening the safety of the large community of foreigners. The Liberal government in London decided to order an invasion of Egypt and crush the Arabia regime—actions which went very much against the ethical inclinations of Gladstone’s foreign policy. In this case, he appears to have fallen in with the arguments of the Liberal imperialists in his Cabinet such as Joseph Chamberlain who wished to overthrow the Arabi government, not in order to protect the British and French loans and investments, but ‘to protect the Canal
and exact reparations for the Alexandria outrages’. Gladstone, according to Gallagher and Robinson, was particularly swayed by the argument about the Canal and the need to protect the India route. In the House of Commons, he justified the intervention on moral and realpolitik grounds.

The following month, a British expeditionary force, under General Wellesley, defeated Arabi and his army at Tel-el-Kebir and brought the country under de facto British control for the next 40 years. Gladstone dispatched Lord Dufferin to Egypt to see how the country should be administered in the future. Egypt became an imperial hybrid. It was neither a colony nor a protectorate and outwardly was independent under the Khedive, who remained under nominal Ottoman control. The reality was somewhat different. Egypt was controlled by a British run civil service and the ‘ultimate sanction was in the hands of the British consul and the English advisers in the Government departments’. Milner encapsulates the reality in his description of Egypt as the Veiled Protectorate’. The personification of British rule was Lord Cromer who held the rather benign and unimportant-sounding titles of British Consul-General and Agent from 1883 to 1907. However, he controlled the levers of power in Egypt, damping down unrest and restoring the country to solvency. Cromer operated in a paternalistic manner, treating the Egyptians and any nationalistic ambitions they held with contempt. Britain made over 66 declarations of its intention to quit Egypt between 1882 and 1919. A.G. Hopkins argues that this did not happen because ‘Britain had important interests to defend in Egypt and she was prepared to withdraw only if conditions guaranteeing the security of these interests were met—and they never were.’ A further complicating matter was the Sudan which was conquered by the British in 1898. They agreed to share sovereignty with the Egyptians who saw it as part of Egypt.
In 1914 Britain found itself at war with the Ottoman Empire, which finally necessitated that Britain formalize the relationship with Egypt in a protectorate. The reigning Khedive, who attempted to ally himself with the Turks, was overthrown to make way for a more quiescent figurehead. The First World War broke Turkish power in the Middle East. In the middle of the war, Britain and France agreed—under the Sykes-Picot understanding—to arbitrarily divide up the Turkish possessions of the Middle East between them. The League of Nations mandate system gave this shabby exercise in great power cynicism both a retrospective legality and a more progressive ring. The British High Commissioner in Egypt had during the war entered into correspondence with the Arab leader, the Sheriff Hussein of Mecca. He wanted and received a pledge of British support for an Arab state that would include most of the Ottoman Empire. The grandiose, but essentially empty, promises of self-determination for subject peoples made, most notably, by the American President Wilson in his Fourteen Points and other speeches further fuelled the sense of betrayal of Arabs.

Egypt shared in the general Arab sense of betrayal by the British, and was shaken by an uprising in March 1919 caused by the decision to deport to Malta an Egyptian delegation (Wafd), which asked that Britain grant the independence that had been promised when Britain needed Arab aid. The disturbances that ensued cost the lives of thousands of Egyptians as the British, in one of their forgotten wars of Empire, crushed the rebellion with great brutality. Field Marshal Allenby, the Commander of British Middle Eastern forces, was made High Commissioner and Lord Milner, the Secretary of State for War, was sent out from Britain to inquire into the disturbances. Strongly supported by Allenby, he chose, surprisingly, considering his record on other imperial questions, to conciliate Egyptian opinion as much as possible. He believed that in order to ‘deflate the Wafdist cause, Egypt should be offered independence and a treaty of alliance that would guarantee Britain’s imperial interests’. He saw that the key issue was the achievement of an agreement that protected British interest in
the Canal. In February 1922, a reluctant Cabinet was persuaded by Allenby to accept his proposals. The Allenby declaration was issued later that month. It conceded formal independence to Egypt and recognized the Khedive as King, but reserved ‘absolutely’ for the British government the following: the security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt; the defense of Egypt against foreign intervention; the protection of foreign interests and the Sudan. The Allenby declaration did not mean all that much. It was merely the concession of ‘little more than a constitutional nicety’. The Colonial Secretary was at pains to point out to the Dominion governments that it preserved fully the ‘status quo with regard to the special interests of the British Empire in Egypt’. The problem of base rights for British troops was not finally resolved until 1936 because neither the Wafd, which had transformed itself into the most powerful nationalist movement in Egypt, nor the royal court was willing to sign a treaty which would be acceptable to the British—for fear that it would lay them open to attacks by the other side. Martin Daly argues that the failure to agree on the unification of Egypt and the Sudan was the key reason that the negotiations failed. (M.W. Daly. (1991): pp 53–8). Furthermore various small pressure groups, the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) and Young Egypt used street protest to prevent a moderate compromise. However, the Egyptian government finally gave in 1936. The Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 negotiated by the young British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, gave Britain wide-ranging military rights in Egypt including the occupation of The Canal Zone, an area that is roughly equivalent in size to Wales. Other rights included full use of the naval base at Alexandria and an alliance with Egypt. (Hurwitz. (1979): pp 487–8). The flaw in the treaty was that it satisfied British security interests without really raising the Egyptians from their previous status as second-class partners. Miles Lampson, the British Ambassador, continued to interfere regularly in Egyptian internal politics and believed it his duty to maintain a Cromer-style influence despite Egyptian independence.
When the Second World War broke out the British used Egypt as their main Middle Eastern base. Such was its importance that, in 1941, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in a directive, could state that the ‘loss of Egypt and the Middle East would be a disaster of the first magnitude to Great Britain, second only to successful invasion] and final conquest’.


1.3- Britain, Egypt and Second World War

Accordingly, Britain during the Second World War reoccupied Egypt to protect its interests from falling into the hands of the Axis powers. In 1940, the Egyptian government of the Nationalist Ali Maher Pasha, considered pro fascists by Britain, was obliged to resign under the pressure of Britain which was considered by Egyptians as another of sign foreign intervention. Another sign was marked when Britain forced King Farouk in February 1942 to choose between abdication or appointing a government of a Foreign office’s choice. Moreover, Britain was able to carry out the military campaigns that secured the allied control of the Middle East, and provide the base area and British troops that defeated the Axis at the Al Alamain Battle and in North Africa. Anti British sentiments grew again in Egypt as the first conference for Arab Unity in Alexandria, 1944 failed to consider Britain as a friend of Arabs. Egypt finally declared War on the Axis hoping to have a place with the emerging United State Nations Organization. Egypt in December 1945 called for the revision of its alliance. In fact, Egypt wanted a withdrawal of British forces from its territories. (McNamara. (2003): pp 15).

When the Second World War ended, Britain remained the paramount Middle Eastern power. Its positions in the region appeared even more firmly entrenched than after the First World War. There were over 50,000 British troops in Egypt occupying the major cities of
Cairo and Alexandria as well as the Canal Zone. British military planners reiterated at the end of the war that the region was second only to the British Isles in terms of its strategic value. The Chiefs of Imperial General Staff in Britain argued that, for Britain to remain a great power, it was imperative to remain in control of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The Egyptian base was to remain a vital cornerstone of British strategy both as a guardian overlooking Britain’s vast Middle Eastern responsibilities and in the post-war nuclear age as a potential airbase for launching atomic attacks against the Soviet Union. The Chiefs of Staff emphasized that;

No effective Middle East Defense can be undertaken without a suitable base to support it… Only in Egypt can such facilities be found on the scale required, and nowhere else in the Middle East could existing facilities be expanded to form a substitute except at prohibitive cost (Mason. (1991), p. 46)

However, the problem was that Britain strategic requirement needed an adequate Reaction to growing Arab Nationalism. Ernest Bevin, The British Foreign Secretary was convinced of the value of the Middle East unlike his Prime Minister, Clement Atlee, Who questioned in 1946-47 the assumptions about the region. He felt that Britain could Not afford the burden of maintaining a massive military presence in the area nor was necessary.20 .The consequence of Atlee’s thinking would have meant a severe truncation of Britain’s global role by abandoning the base of Suez and evacuating from Egypt. (McNAMARA. (2003): pp16)

During the Second World War, the British had bought goods and services from the Egyptians, and as a result sterling balances to the value of £400 million were owed to the Egyptians. These remained unconvertible to dollars owing to the British mechanism known as ‘blocking’, but would eventually be so. Chancellor of the Exchequer Dalton feared that to maintain the base in Egypt would mean that Britain could find itself ‘in the impossible position of borrowing money from the Egyptians in order to maintain our forces in Egypt’
Despite this powerful argument, Bevin maintained his policy in the Middle East considering the area the most sensitive one for Britain though its heavy financial burdens and political disputes among the members of the British Cabinet. In 1945, Egypt had replied to Bevin’s call for partnership by asking for a revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty on 20 December 1945 and In 1945, Following an advice of Antony Eden, Secretary of the State, contributed to found the Arab League Organization in Cairo. This action was as an acknowledgement of Egyptian role in the Arab world. Yet, Britain did not want to strengthen the Egyptian role, but rather to use its Relations with it to protect its interests in the area, and On 2 April 1946 the British government sent a delegation to Cairo to negotiate. The Chiefs of Staff were willing to compromise that British ground troops could go but that airbases were needed but The Egyptians wanted a full British evacuation. The leader of the British delegation recommended accepting the Egyptians’ demand. In May 1946 Bevin and Attlee agreed that they would publicly offer the withdrawal of all British forces from Egyptian territory before sitting down to discuss future defense arrangements This brought a furious reaction from Winston Churchill on the opposition benches.. He remained an inveterate opponent of compromise with the Egyptians. Bevin ignored Churchill’s concerns and proceeded to withdraw British troops from Cairo and the other major cities to the Canal Zone by March 1948. He also tried to renegotiate a more palatable agreement on future British use of the base. Unfortunately, Bevin’s plans for a new partnership with Egypt were stillborn. Negotiations on the base soon were mixed up with the other issue that divided the two sides—the future of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Egypt wanted that country—which was officially governed under an arrangement of joint sovereignty between them and the British—to be unified with Egypt under the Egyptian crown. Whoever controlled Sudan would control the headwaters of the Nile, the lifeblood of Egypt. It would also of course allow a massive expansion of the territory of Egypt. The British felt that the Sudan would be more malleable towards British policy if it
were free from the influence of the Egyptians. At the end of January 1947, negotiations on the base broke down over the Sudan issue. (Kent. (1993): pp 50).

According to Bullock this ‘prejudiced any chance of agreement in the Anglo-Egyptian talks’ (quoted in (2003):pp18). Of all the many mistakes made in the long history of Anglo-Egyptian relations, this was perhaps the gravest error made on the Egyptian side. If the Egyptians had agreed to these terms Britain would have withdrawn its troops nearly a decade before it eventually did under the agreement negotiated by Nasser. He received no better terms on the Sudan or on the base in 1953–54 than could have been negotiated in 1946–47.

Moreover, Britain’s Egyptian relations went badly because of creation of Israel in, May 1948, out of the Palestine’s mandate. The harsh defeat of the British supplied Arab armies convinced the Arab leaders in general and the Egyptian ones in particular that Britain was deeply involved in betraying the Arab states though it refused to recognize the State of Israel at the beginning seeking maintaining its influence in the Middle East. But, The Arabs were convicted Britain would not side with them against Israel According to The historian Vatiskiotis: their firm belief that their defeat in the field had been due mainly to the British control of Egyptian military training and arms supplies and to the involvement of the palace and politicians in several arm scandals (quoted in. McNamara. (2003):pp18 )

The defeat in the first Arab-Israeli War caused too many troubles for Egyptian politicians mainly for the King and his Prime Nahas Pasha appointed in 1951. Both agreed on calling for immediate evacuation of British troops and unification of Egypt and Soudan after Herbert Morison’s declaration seeking a new Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in April 1951. Morrison refused a withdrawal unless Egypt would guarantee its alliance with the West. The tension kept going on and no agreement was signed. Still the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was not ratified and the relations came into ahead after the 1952’s coup d’état By The Free Officers. (McNamara (2003): pp17-19).
The free officer movement of 1952

The revolution of 1952 what is came to be called the Coup which was planned by a group of junior military officer since the early 1940, calling themselves the free officer that headed by colonel Jamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970). The group consolidated with an executive committee of nine men. This group decided to carry out coup as possible of the event of black Saturday. The experiences of Nasser were exemplary of free officer that helped to clarify the influence which formed the new generation of Egyptian rulers. Nasser’s father was rural villager who moved to Alexandria and become the postal service where his son (Jamal) was born. Jamal Abdel Nasser lived a hard life when he was eight and his mother died therefore Nasser rose and grew up with different relatives in Cairo and Alexandria and during his high school year, he participated in anti demonstration and he was wounded through the protest. (Vatikiotis. (1961): pp 47-49)

After his high school graduation in 1936, Nasser become is accepted at the Egyptian military school which had opened its doors to the sons of lower and middle classes. And in 1938 was spent war year in Sudan and Western Desert and in this time he set up relatives with numerous of the individuals that later shaped the executive committee of the free officer. In spite of Nasser’s commendable performance in Palestine war he and his other officers suffered from humiliation of the Egyptian defeat by Israel which later caused by the corruption of the king Faruq, the civilian politicians and some figures of high command. The feeling of Nasser and his colleagues by the patriotic duty made him to avenge to the disaster of 1948.

Nasser and several of core participation in free officers movement were not scion of the landed and professional elite but the sons of the small peasant proprietors, minor government officials and petty merchant and other group came from the middle class but they
were all from the strata of society that shafted under the British occupation and hardboard grievance at the indigenous ruling classes as well as they stood for the emergence of new generation into position of authority. During the revolution the ages of all junior officer marked difference from 28 to 35 year, moreover they might not have enough public support for their youth and opacity and before carrying out the coup, general Mohammed Najib appointed as figure head of free officer for his senior and become the most popular figure in the regime from the 1948 conflict.

The free officer were willing to end the British occupation and reforms, social justice that came into ambiguous nations also the free officer were pragmatic nationalist and diligent military bureaucrats with no predetermined view on political organization or ideological direction. The program of free officer 1951 contain six point which were; end and elimination the British colonization and fight down of its collaborators, avoid of feudalism, the ending of the political control of the state by foreign capital, the establishment of social justice, the formation of strong national army and the creation of healthy democratic life.

The previous officers undertook a power and they joined themselves into Nasserled organization called the revolutionary command council (RCC) that worked as the executive body of the government. The RCC had no preconceived plan for management the country, it tend to respond to situation as they arose and in this way the regime gradually took shape and found its direction. While the organization that headed by Nasser wasn’t completely without plan, and in the process of coalesced its power the RCC reduce twofold campaign.

The first one the rival concurrent for power and the second one tried to gain popular support by proclaiming reforms and introducing new constitution. The purpose of the first rival to deal with King Faruq who was obliged to abdicate after three days of coup. The last ruler in the line Mohammed Ali travelled out Alexandria harbor on the royal yacht and he
destined idle away the remainder of his life on the French Riviera. In 1953 Egypt declared a republic and monarchy abolished, according to the Wafd and other parties the RCC declared a series of sweeping political change that effectively avoided the old order. The constitution of 1923 abolished, parliament was dissolved, and all political parties were prevented. The regime went on to declare a three-year transitional period during the RCC would act as the supreme executive. Nagib assumed the offices of president and prime minister, but secretly Nasser remained minister of the interior, and other civilian politicians members subrogated by the RCC members and the additional officer were appointed to oversee the bureaucracy. The military was assuming a complete control of the state. In 1954 another RCC decree prohibited anyone who held public office from 1946 to 1952 from doing so again. This effectively prevented the old order politicians from participation in public life and opened the way for new generation from different stratum of society to assume position of authority within the bureaucracy. The RCC organize a party which called liberation Rally, it gained control and support of such interest groups as student and workers. In this time the libration Rally was the only party permitted in the country but unfortunately failed to generate much enthusiasm.

The Muslim brotherhood was the main rival for power of the RCC what was way from the political organization in the country, at the time of the coup 1952 many of the free officer had close ties to the brotherhood and there was an early phase of cooperation between the two organization as each hoped eventually to control the other, they could not however, coexist and in 1954 the RCC provide with an excuse to strike when members of brotherhood tried to murdered Jamal Abdel Nasser. The RCC peeved and avenge by executing six of brotherhood’s leaders and imprisoning thousand of its members although the organization was driven underground it was neither forgotten nor eliminated and would be heard again. The RCC also struck hard against group on the political left. Strongly after the coup, workers at
large textile plant near Alexandria went on strike and rampaged through the factory in the name of the people’s revolution. The RCC ordered the military to put down the strike arranged for the trial and execution of its ringleaders and took advantage the existence of the labor unrest to imprison leaders of communist party and other leftists.

It was difficult for RCC to set up control of the armed forces and ensure their loyalty to investigate in the end the close friend of Nasser Abd El Hkim Amr appointed and elevated to the post of commander in the chief by Jamal Abdel Nasser, opposition Amr occupied as the regime’s political operative within the military for the next fifteen years. The relation between the RCC and military (free officer) were severally tension by the contest for power between Najib and Nasser that broke into the open in the early of 1954. Instead acting as purely figure head president that RCC intended Nagib became a popular public personality and started to illustrate his own views on the direct of revolution, views that often differed from Nasser but Nasser was determined to retain control of revolution and thrust a private struggle against Najib. Nasser argued the letter in fighters and in November 1954 was banged of supporting Muslims brotherhood therefore he removed from the office and forced to endure until his death in 1984. Within two years of the coup Nasser had broken the existing centers of civilian power, purged the military of potential rivals and maneuvered himself into position as the dominant political force within Egypt through consolidation power (free officer and RCC) the RCC retain a popular support through the introduction of reforms and in 1954 it investigate the agrarian reform law of September, the main term of the law limited the amount of agricultural land a signal individual could own 200 feddans and the surplus redistribution to peasant who less than 5 feddans as well as the land and properties of the royal family were confiscated and include into redistribution program and regime’s purpose was reducing the political and economic power land holding elite. Although the land reform were imperfectly administrated their very existence showed the new regime repudiation of the old social
economic and political order and this later become hallmark of Nasser era and was subject of considerable favorable commentary both within and outside Egypt during the regime’s early year. (Cleveland (2000): pp 295-300).

1.5-Conclusion:

As a conclusion the first chapter we gave a historical context of the Anglo- Egyptian relations, Since the invasion of 1882 until 1951 with focus on the major event that influenced on those relations as well as we expressed the duplicity and diplomacy of British to remain its interest in Suez canal. also we gave a brief insight to the effective role of the free officer movement who were willing to end British occupation and Faruq’s regime and open the way for new generation to assume the authority.
CHAPTER TWO

The historical context of the Suez Crisis Post Second World war
Introduction

To understand very well the Suez Crisis, it should be explain its most influencing context, the Cold War and the importance and advantage of the Suez Canal that engaged the interest of eastern-western bloc. The cold war was a result of accumulating events of competition among the two blocs that wanted to control and presented the Middle East. The United State and The Soviet Union willed to protect their interest in the area by more interference in regional affairs. However, Britain and France wanted a military intervention to overcome President Nasser. That led to objections among the Western countries on how to deal with Nasser, which triggered American policy makers of possibility the Soviet from exploiting the situation in the Middle East. In addition The Crisis transferred to when the tripartite alliance of Britain, France and Israel decided to invade Egypt without consultation the American. Despite the military success, the war was followed by harsh political and economic troubles for the aggressors who were subjected to serious financial and political pressures to halt their military intervention and to look for a political means to solve the problem via the United Nations Organization.

2.1-The cold war context of the Suez crisis

The cold war saw deepening Soviet-American competition in the middle east from the mid 1950 on the three level ,the first one is geopolitical struggle to join allies and secure access to resources such as oil , the second one is ideological rivalry for the future of the Muslims and the third one diplomatic maneuvers . However, the soviet power and the united state were not only factor affecting the situation in the region, the British also played largest power after United State and Soviet Union as well as it considered as strongest of Western Europe (France, Germany in political and economic). In spite of the British exchequer ‘s
bankruptcy and its precarious economic position in 1947. Britain did not hinder from playing an important role with western alliance against Soviet communism in the period of the cold war. In these period Britain and United State agreed and established a copartner ship that aimed on restraining communism in Europe and Asia and because of the British’s economic weakness the British president decided to involve United State in European affair and exploit the opportunities that offered by Truman in order to limit the Soviet aggression in Europe therefore the United State provided economic and military support to the continent through the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall plan and the North Atlantic treaty Organization (NATO). (Jackson. (2001): pp26,27)

British had major economic and politic interest on the middle east in 1950 and in the half of nineteenth century the diplomatic objective of great Britain in the middle east showed as defense and preservation its India Empire. However with competition of the Suez canal in 1869 led to increase the British interests in the middle east because of the Suez canal drastically shortened the time, the passage to India and other British possessions around the Mediterranean sea. It was great importance to the British trade, that why any interruption of free passage through the canal would put the British financial and trading interest in an embarrassing situation. In addition the Suez canal become very important to the British interest when the oil discovered in Iran and other middle eastern countries in the early of the twentieth century. In the fact, the canal was perceived as imperial lifeline that facilitate the oil trade and it considered as vital route communication to the British interest in the far east e.g.: Malta and Empire in the east Africa and Australia. (Almong. (2003): pp1,2)

The Suez canal was used for troops for seventy –five year and it was operated by Anglo–French company and was advocated by 30,000 Tummies that stationed at the Suez base. As well as the Suez canal during the early year of the cold war considered as a home to
royal air force squadron which aimed and intend bombarded the Union Soviet by automatic bomb. In July 1952 Jamal Abdel Nasser and his friend (the group of officer) assumed the power in Cairo and declared to overcome British influence and in 1954 Jamal Abel Nasser tried to move back British troops from Suez base and he demanded from United State a military support in the year that following an Israeli attack on Egyptian troops in Gaza. In September 1955 Nasser exchanged Egyptian cotton for Czechoslovakia’s weapons (eastern bloc) and all that after Washington refused to uphold Egyptian’s arm. The largest aim of Nasser was to make Egypt at three center circles (Africa, the Arab world and the emerging non-aligned movement) rather than to become soviet satellite. During the mid 1950 the Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev was blessed to provide Egypt by gains and rubbles. However Nasser opposition to the western regional defense organization like Baghdad pact and his support for non-aligned like Indonesia’s Sukarno suit the soviet plans and encouraged the newly independent nations of Africa and Asia against Europe colonial power and their American allies. (Douglass. (2010): pp306.307).

The president Eisenhower and his secretary of State John Foster Dulles provided economic assistance to engage Egypt toward the west in order to prevent Russian contravention in the middle east. Furthermore, Britain and United State, the world bank granted Nasser’s 200 million to build high dam on the upper Nile at Aswan, a monumental public works project, whereas during of 1956 the project of the Aswan was resolved just when it arrived in Washington and London and in July.19 Eisenhower announced that they should move back U.S offers and at the same time John Foster Dulles reported the Egyptian ambassador “no single project was as unpopular today as Aswan dam “so the United State showed that it was not willing to provide financial support to Egypt even though the American official recognized that Egypt had ability to pay their loans.
Nasser was offended from the American decision and because he was communicated with them previously. Therefore he had secured a million 400 which engagement from Kremlin in early June in addition he supported by soviet military and economic assistance. On July 26 Jamal Abdel Nasser announced that Egypt was expropriating the Anglo-French company that operated the Suez canal and world tools to finance the Aswan dam that led British official to resentment and during a late night cabinet meeting, Anthony Eden and his colleagues vowed never to accept Egyptian control of the waterway and agreed that our essential interest in these era, must if necessary be safeguarded by military action. Eisenhower also regarded Nasser’s action as sham full but he was worried that armed intervention would back fire and instructed Dulles to seek a diplomatic solution. While the diplomatic informed the Egyptian made certain note to disrupt the oil tankers passing through the canal, but reinforcing the American view that any resort to military force would be misguided and premature that stimulated Britain and France to send troops but Eisenhower warned Eden on September “the people of the near east and north Africa and to some extent of all Asia and all Africa would be consolidated against the west to degree which I fear could not be overcome in a generation and perhaps not even in century particularly having in mind the capacity of the Russian to make mischief” (quoted in. Douglass. (2010): pp 308).

On October 23 British, French and Israeli official met secretly at Sever in order to organize the tripartite scheme, thus Israeli planed to invade Egypt and march to Suez canal whereas Britain and France decided to withdraw ten miles from the waterway and when Nasser failed to pull back his forces from their own territory the French and British would intervene. Six day later, the Israeli organized a lightening attack and at these time Washington demanded an immediate ceasefire under UN auspices and cautioned London and Paris to stop sending troops and worked to prevent Moscow from intervening however
Eisenhower declared that any aggression happened on November 6 he would condemn the Israeli as aggressors to this end Khrushchev embraced Nasser and send a nuclear threat against Britain and France and offered to send in Russia peacekeeper to guarantee regional stability. (Douglass.(2010):pp 307-9).

2.2-The Aswan dam and the nationalization of the Suez Canal

In the period of growing uncertainty over the US Anglo–Egyptian co-operated about the Aswan dam project, Jamal Abdel Nasser and the Egyptian government placed the Aswan dam as high enterprise on the agenda. And because it was as immense project that required a huge finance, the world bank was the obvious source and in the end 1955 the world bank announced that the project was an acceptable from an economic and technical point of view, at the same time Egypt was negotiated with Britain treasury to pay the debt (15million) that was owed to the Egyptian from the end the second world war and that was as blocked account in the bank of England. On December 2 the world bank decided to concede the Egyptian government 20 million and to bear the defray at all cost as well as the US and British government declared that they were willing to give Egypt 56 million and the 14 million in the high of alpha plan. Nevertheless the antagonist of Nasser toward alpha plan and the west led to disturbance the British and American government. In addition they started to doubt Nasser’s ability to pay off loans. This business resulted an exceptions by the Senate Appropriation committee which decided in the end that none of the funds for Egypt that was to finance the Aswan Dam, however the river Nile considered as lifeblood of Egypt and more importance. Moreover when the president of the World Bank, Eugene Black arrived to Cairo
to discuss Nasser with final offer, she showed kinds of counter proposal for the loans that was unacceptable to capitalize the project.

Thus, on July 19, Dulles told the Egyptian ambassador, Ahmed Hussein, that US government had decided to withdraw their offer to finance the Aswan dam, these later came as surprise and shock to the both: the British government and Egypt therefore Macmillan wrote later «when he heard, on 19 July, Dulles had bluntly told the Egyptian ambassador, Ahmed Hussein that US government had decided to withdraw their support from the scheme“ (quoted in p76). Tow later days Britain declared its retreating from the undertaking because these later deemed as relief due to its own hard financial situation.

Jamal Abdel Nasser perceived very well that Aswan Dam project was very important for Egypt as a whole therefore he did not remain sleepy so on 26 July 1956 Nasser nationalized the Suez canal company and took over operation of the canal, and that day Nasser declared in his speech that he nationalized the Suez canal in order to use and exploit the revenue of Suez canal company’s large part to fund the building Dam. Nasser’s act came as massive shock to the British government and affirmed their worst doubts Nasser, however when Anthony Eden, he was totally frustrated and wrote “I had no doubt” in addition Eden believed that Britain lost to keep all brutish assets and the Suez canal as international waterway. In this decision necessitated a prompt reaction by France, Britain and United State and two year later of nationalization Nasser legally could nationalize the canal and to pay the compensation to previous owner but his promises about use income of Suez canal for building Dam was so much ambiguous which mean that no intention of paying compensation
Nasser’s action threatened Britain’s status in the Arab world therefore the British government took speed reaction; thus on 28 July the bank of England and commercial banks were granted authority to block the current Egyptian sterling balances in London in addition the funds and assets of the Suez canal in London were protected against Egyptian expropriation and all export of arms and military material banned but in the same time this crisis also a dangerous effect toward Britain’s finance, in particular it threatened the position of pound because the most countries which were transferable its large amount of sterling were Arab countries and oil companies so, if the canal or communication lines were interrupted, the position of Britain would obviously worsen, that mean that Britain would have to buy her oil in dollars which mean this later that Britain lose her advantage from supplying oil. due to the crisis oil, Anthony Eden told” we had prepare to back our remonstration with military action “(quoted in Almong (2003): pp77) as well as Anthony Eden wished from US government to resist with them against Nasser.

the French was supported Britain in its action because the French were readiness and eager to attack and organize military operation against Nasser because French believe that Nasser’s defeat would solve their problem in Algeria. The French government was an anxious to attack Nasser more than British government and it believe that the United State would stand by them regardless of the situation. though Britain and France did note share the same outlook but they interested so much on issues that related to middle east as whole and Egypt in particular and all that to secure their position and income. On 29 July the French prime foreign minister said “one successful battle in Egypt would be worth ten in Africa “.(quoted in Almong (2003):pp77). On 29 July the French were showed their willing to cooperate with British military commanders in order to make air force over Egypt and to proceed a military
planning against Nasser as a result they did an operation which called Musketeer that aimed to all control over the canal and changing Nasser ‘s regime.

Instead the American was countered the both French and British for using the military force because they feared the military forces against Egypt may be have a grave result therefore the president Eisenhower tried to persuade his view Eden but without any advantage ,the British and French government were absolute to complete the military forces . (Almong. (2003): pp75-78).

2.3-Importance & Advantages of the Canal

Ezzat M. El Sadek debated that the Suez Canal had many of importance and advantages which this later made the western- eastern bloc were interested around it, the main advantages and importance according to Ezzat M. El Sadek were the following:

Importance of the Canal:

- The Suez Canal is considered to be the shortest link between the east and the west due to its unique geographic location; it is an important international navigation canal linking between the Mediterranean sea at Port said and the red sea at Suez .The unique geographical position of the Suez Canal makes it of special importance to the world and to Egypt as well.
- This importance is getting augmented with the evolution of maritime transport and world trade. The maritime transport is the cheapest means of transport, whereas more than 10 % of the world trade volume is transported via waterways (seaborne trade).
Saving in distance, time and in operating costs for vessels that transit the Canal, also firm up this importance (Ezzat.Sadak. (2009): pp 20)

The map represents the Suez Canal as shortest link among the west and east (quoted in Ezzat.Sadak. (2009): pp 23)

Advantages of the Suez Canal

- It is the longest canal in the world without locks.
- Navigation goes day and night.
- The Canal is liable to be widened and deepened when required, to cope with the development in ship sizes and tonnages.
• With the adoption of the Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS) (a system depending upon the most up-to-date radar network), vessels can be monitored and followed on every spot of the Canal and intervention in emergency cases can be taken. (Ezzat.Sadak.2009):pp 10)

3.4- The fighting over the Suez (October 29-November 6, 1956)

After Nasser’s decision of nationalization, the Suez canal on July 26, 1956. the aim of nationalization was to use the tools to finance to build Aswan dam therefore Nasser declared that Britain and France could “shake on their rage” \(^1\). Britain and France were disappointed and immediately expropriated Nasser’s action and tried to regain international control over the canal Suez. Moreover, the prime minister Eden sent the first telegram to president Eisenhower announced that military options were being investigated from the outside:

“As we see it we are unlikely to attain our objective by economic Pressure alone ……..we ought in the first instance to bring the Maximum political pressure to bear on Egypt …….My colleagues And I are convinced that we must be ready, in the last resort, to Use force to bring Nasser to his sense”. (Mc Dermott. (1998) pp 139)

Eisenhower’s initial reaction to Nasser decision was stopped o possibly dangerous of military engagement. (Mc Dermott. (1998) pp135-138)

in addition, during the years since Israel became a nation in 1948, The attack on Suez was deemed as one of the most Israeli –Egyptians clash at that time, the British and French
entered into attack with Israeli and attempted to take back the control over Suez canal due to Egypt's nationalization decree of July 26, 1956. And Because Egypt had refused the Israeli ships from using the canal, the Israeli’s interest increased about the status of the canal and they hoped to annul Egypt's nationalization decree of July 26, 1956.as well as London and Paris were very confident that Cairo did not reject them to using the Suez canal because the west European nations relied on oil supplies that passed through the Suez canal. After Nasser's nationalization decision, , England and France broke out maritime troops and paratroopers into region and they intimidated Egypt to use force if Jamal Abdel Nasser did not want to take part with them on the control of Suez canal .but between on July and October all the equalization’s effort and solutions were failed. Thus, John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State investigated to engage in the Suez Canal by association that called Suez Canal User's Association (SCUA) but unfortunately Jamal Abel Nasser denied Dulles’s suggestion. Next, the UN Security Council worked out a compromise for an international canal agency. On October 13; the Soviet Union seemed to Egypt as it accepted the plan but in fact the Soviet Union vetoed the plan and when the compromises began and continued, the French, British, and Israeli held secretly military meeting against Egypt. On October 24, at Sevres, near Paris, the three nations (Britain, Israeli, and France) agreed to carry out and trigger the aggression as they designed at Sevres. on October 29, Israeli forces triggered a raid against Egypt and advanced across Sinai toward Suez canal (see the map bellow).the next day ,the government of Britain and France ordered Cairo and Tel Aviv to ceasefire thought they perceived that Nasser would refuse therefore , On October 31 ,British and French planes bombed Egyptian airfield and destroyed most of their air force .They also bombed Cairo . On November 2, British’s naval troops and its paratroopers took up Port Said and they forced the Egyptian forces to withdraw from the west of the Canal Zone. However, the reaction of UN to stop the
crisis was, initially, ineffective. Thus, British and French denied the decision October 31 Security Council to “refrain from the use of force.” Also On November 2, a UN General Assembly resolution required to ceasefire and withdrawal from the region but without any benefit and implementation. Therefore, on November 4, Lester Pearson of Canada suggested that a UN Emergency Force should control the ceasefire. On November 6, the Soviet Union upheld Egypt also the president of union soviet, Khrushchev intimated the western bloc to intervene immediately by sending their forces if they did not stop attack or ceasefire. Therefore Eisenhower and Dulles objected the aggression of the three nation from the outset and they decided to use both of United Nations and backed Pearson's attempts for appropriate compromises.

On November 6, Eisenhower decided to apply greater pressure on Britain and France. Financial pressure was applied by the United States' selling British pounds on the exchange to damage British currency rates and cutting off oil supplies from Latin America to Europe. Before the end of the day, November 6 the fighting in Suez had stopped because the British, French, and Israelis accepted the ceasefire and the intervention of the UN supervisory force. (Michael. (2009): pp 2).
The map represent Israeli’s invasion during d October, 29, 1956 (Scott. (2009): pp5)

2.5-Conclusion

As a conclusion chapter two investigates the different contexts of the crisis, most important of all that of the Cold War with focus on American-Soviet attitudes toward the crisis leading to the Suez War. The Suez War will be referred to briefly but the analysis will mainly stress the tripartite strategy for the invasion of Egypt. Finally, international reactions to the War will be probed, mainly the American-Soviet roles, in forcing a cease fire and thus by halting the invasion the Suez war ended.
CHAPTER THREE

The Suez Canal Crisis’s impact
Introduction

The Suez crisis of 1956 was a turning point in global history as it marked emergence of a new international order. Britain and France, their empires were in an advanced stage of decline. They lost leadership in the Middle East and in other regions to the USA and the USSR. Thus, the competition for influence in the Third World began between the two superpowers.

3.1-The impact the Suez Crisis on the Soviet Union

The outcome of the Suez crisis was interpreted by Moscow that was argued the Soviet Union was the major beneficiary of the 1956 crisis. However Britain and France didn’t believed that their influence in the Suez region was ended whereas The United States was not related to its allies so much therefore the Soviet Union exploited the position to be the champion of third world especially the Arab. However and due to behavior of Soviet Union the Soviet-Arab relations was apparent as well as there were a numerous element that were dissonance.

First of all the Egyptian tried to take a credit from the Soviet in order to defeat the west politically in addition the Egyptian attitude was clear in their media and careful insistence upon the unique Arab role in the crisis and the stress of Egyptian did not mean that they would give to soviet threat a coverage’s editorial or any gratefulness. However Jamal Abdel Nasser believed the other outside effort (as effort of President Eisenhower) rather than the Soviet Union.

Secondly the Egyptians were offended because of soviet’s postponement and its inactivity during the Suez crisis in addition Nasser declared clearly in his speech that the Soviets waited nine days to do what they want and what they were in their mind as well as
Sadat announced that his disappointment with Moscow started since now and he said that the Americans would able to play the major role in finishing the crisis. In addition to that Heikal said that the main corruption in the 1958 and 1960 crisis was the soviet and Egypt relations

Thirdly, the Arabs became a wise to the priorities of soviets and they perceived that their concern over the crisis was the secondary concern to the Soviet. In these times the soviets wanted to do a little rather than to involve into propaganda action and they wanted to exploit the crisis to their political advantage. Instead the Soviets saw the poor role of the Arab armies with support of soviet arms could reinforce those with Kremlin who proved for the clause the newer and better supplies which assist and train the Arab armies. At the same time it may have reinforced in the same degree those who object the participation in the whole as produce a various views around the issue. However and as a result the war between the Arab and Israeli which came in the near of the future would be positive option for the Soviet’s unwillingness to intervene.

And by highlighting on the importance of United State and its risks emanating of military power, it might led to the confrontation between the Soviet Union and United State. In spite of crisis of Suez gave the Soviet Union prestige in the eyes of some region ,Eisenhower Doctrine which resulted from the crisis by president Eisenhower led to negative phenomena for the Soviet Union, thus the reaction of Moscow was not importance because the only one who had right to chose were Egyptians. However in 1957, February the Soviet suggested a Soviet- American cooperative approach that contain a finding a peaceful solution to the Arab - Israeli dispute in order to make the relation between Egyptian and Soviets satisfied and improved and these relation was build on the two point .the first point that the soviets were unwilling to do anything and everything in the way of providing the supplies and equipments to Egypt .and the second point Union soviet did not want to make confrontation between Soviets –Americans also they were unwilling to support the way by better weapons
because in their opinion there was preference for political means over military (Iroe and Shemesh (1990): pp 212–13).

3.2-The Impact of Suez Crisis on United States

The Suez Crisis of October 1956 deeply changed the policy of Washington toward the Middle East. The events that occurred and its remembrance stimulated the United States to become the strongest power in the Middle East in the first period, after Britain and France. When the Union Soviet acceded in United Nations and decided to cease the attack of British, French and Israeli on Egypt, the American government disturbed from the Union Soviet (Moscow) and expected and persuaded that the Soviet Union would be the major competitor in the Middle East. When the United State’s president, Dwight Deisenhofer declared to help non-communist states in the Middle East by his new doctrine From January 1957 until July 1958 and when American marines stationed in Beirut, the Eisenhower administration practiced three principals which related to Suez region that were as following:

(1) The United States had greater influence in the Middle East than any other outside power.
(2) Communism was the major problem of the Arab Middle East.
(3) Jamal Abd al-Nasser of Egypt was an agent of the Soviet Union.

But unfortunately the Eisenhower’s policy for investigating these three principals was failed. When the American government disregarded the quarrel which occurred among Arab and Israeli, the American diplomacy became demoralized and their influence in the Middle East was turned back. After that, Eisenhower administration called the three aggressor (Israeli-British-French) to retreat its invasion on Egypt, but these later was very difficult for secure the constancy. The aftermath of Suez left Washington with impasse because of the
United State seemed as it able to solve any problem but in the fact it rarely was gave the suitable solution.

President Eisenhower confirmed on 5 January, 1957 that the middle east was always desirable by Russia therefore Eisenhower demanded military assistance from congress to the countries of the middle east in the next tow year because he wanted to execute the international communism in the region in addition he required to put American military forces which considered as it came to protect the integrity and independence of nation and countries which assumed by international communism. However congress refused Eisenhower request. But with the time the American could stop the aggression on Egypt thus, they could carry the United State than European power also and at the same time American diplomacy sorrowed when they entered the Union Soviet into United Nation in cease fire. The president Eisenhower announced in the end of 1956 that Jamal Abdel Nasser believe Moscow than Washington in cease the war as well as he describe him as evil influence and he declared to Dulles that they would exploit the opinion of Britain and France against Egypt and all that for restraining the Union Soviet forces. The aim of the United State was bring attention of Arab State about Nasser’s dangerous and change their opinion toward Nasser but without any benefit. The views of most stats did not alter against Egypt. Thus, American government hated Nasser for many reasons such as: desire Nasser to transact with Union soviet, his request for military assistance from the Soviet for his armed forces and his recognition of the Peoples’ Republic of China and willingness Nasser to unify the Arab world led to disturb the United Nation. Therefore with the effect of Suez the United State played as savior of conservative Arabs from Nasserism. The method was designed to be more acceptable in the Middle East.

After two months, many of politician’s debate contributed in modifying the version of the Eisenhower Doctrine which was adopted by Joint Resolution as well as congress
annulated the assertion which contain the peace of the world and the security of the United States are endangered as long as international communism and the nations it controls seek by threat of military action, use of economic pressure, internal subversion, or other means to attempt to bring under their domination; peoples now free and independent. Although congress had authority to make war, congress did not permit the president to send forces and troops in the event of the Middle East crisis. But its resolution gave to United State the right to prepare itself to using the military forces to help any nation that demanding assistance against armed aggression. Therefore some observers concluded that congress declared that the president had the right to anticipate this emergency power when necessary and it deemed as resolution to congress when appropriate as well as this report came to persuade the president Eisenhower to use and put the armed forces at the presidential will.

Although Congress discussed the resolution of Eisenhower doctrine, but the States of the Middle East expressed widely different views around the Eisenhower doctrine for instance in January, v Lebanon welcomed the resolution and three member of the Baghdad pact (Turkey, Iran, Iraq). Lebanon reinforced this declaration in general approach. However Egypt and Syria accused the United State for its proclaimed that international communism was the real danger and its disregarding to Western imperialism and Zionism which were in fact the real danger in the Middle East. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and Jordan declared that they would not authorize foreign globe to intervene in their region. however after a late of January King Saud soon annulated himself and he visit to Washington and at February meeting in Cairo he spoke in favor of Eisenhower’s anticommunism. Therefore by March, the Eisenhower Doctrine had hardened divisions in the Muslim world between the ‘Northern tier’ of mostly non-Arab states in the Baghdad Pact, which supported the U.S., and those closer to Egypt, opposed to it. Lebanon, confronting Syria and Israel, welcomed any outside support. The reaction of Israel was not enthusiasm because they were preoccupied with. Early 1957

3.3-The impact of Suez Crisis on Israeli

Although of the difficulties which faced Israeli in Gaza during the period that following its withdrawal from Sinai. The Suez operation was argued for that the security and international status of Israeli was improved in the initial period complication in addition the Suez operation proved that Israeli was the only party which profited from the Suez war. As well as Suez operation handed a sense of safety for Israeli and it achieved the security for southern border in the region while the activities of fedayeen contributed to stop the Israel’s military victory and helped to demoralize turmoil and the claim of Israeli that it had an ability to defend by itself. However, during 1957 and 1958 there were major events that occurred, for example Israeli’s ability to condemn itself became hard than previously and its military victory in Suez smoothed the way for a new era in Israeli. In this period Israeli was interested to investigate its internal aims more than before, for example Israelis wanted to: building its internal strength, invest in science and higher education, and absorbing the mass Jewish immigration from North Africa and the Eastern bloc. Addition, it extended its relations with new countries and built a more positive image worldwide. Therefore the prime minister, Ben-Gurion informed IDF (Israeli defense forces) in December 1956 that triumph of Israeli in Suez gave great advantage and he assured that he could obtain freedom to use passage through Tiran Straits also Ben –Gurion added that Israeli wanted the world’s recognition for its right to exploit the freedom passage and its right to use force in order to protect these passage and in order to open the gate which was among Asia and Africa therefore Ben – Gurion announced as a result that the Sinai war was like ‘lightning that rekindled the fires of
inspiration in the Jewish people’. (Quoted in Almong. (2003). pp 128). Ben-Gurion declared in his speech to the significance of western power and his willingness to do relations with all worlds’ region, as well as he announced that the international role of great power was still alive even though they didn’t stay in the same situation as before so, it means that France and Britain were still great power which were contributed gigantically to civilization. Ben-Gurion thought that the only country which would demand its withdrawal from the Suez was United States therefore Ben- Gurion declared that, ‘We must be aware’ and he told, ‘that Israel’s security and strength depended not only on its military capacity, but to a large extent on its position in the international sphere.’ (Quoted in. Almong. (2003): pp128). In these statement Ben- Gurion pointed that the emerging a good Israeli’s security was not relied only on military forces but also it was required the developing its foreign relation in order to set up its status in the world wide. However, the result of Suez crisis mad Ben Gurion to insist more than ever and at the same time the British ambassador Sir Francis Rundall noted the impact of Suez war on Israel’s self-confidence and he wanted to exploit the position and take revenge in any time. At the same time the Israeli perceived the possibility of economic pressure especially from the United States due to the stress of Suez campaign therefore it became more aware of public opinion. However the barbarity of the bygone years changed by growing realization of Israeli which must persuade the grimmer to live in area of active tension between East and West. Moreover Israelis government’ deemed the risk was necessary because it would gave far greater repercussion than ever to any initiative on their part and He also believed that the maintenance of the status quo in the region was of major interest to Israel. When they settled in the Suez crisis they tried to bring the security to Israeli on the southern border and to make vast relation with many countries. The main Israeli’s agenda was after Suez was making relation with Asian and African state. So Ben-Gurion noted the significance of these relations and he tried to express that important for Israeli because he
believed one day the African and Asian states would be strongest political factor in the world. Thus during the 1950s and 1960s, the relation between the African-Asian states and Israeli called as the ‘Periphery Treaty’ which considered as the main priorities in that period. Ben Gurion perceived that the relation of African and Asian was important especially in the light of the cold when the fight was triggered in the Asian and African among the west and east and at the same time he observed that the African and Asian which became independent didn’t will to be related with western power that was previously occupied it therefore Israeli noted that there was an opportunity for it, thus it was exploited the position of small nation which were under the British imperialism in order to offer aid to and advice to those nation.

Consequently the Suez affair contributed to give an positive image for Israeli especially with those countries therefore Ben Gurion was always perceived the friendship among the African-Asian and Israeli was based on common ground for instance Israeli tried to partake the fear of the pan-Arab movement. Israeli was wanted to help these countries in repairing their towns by helping their inhabitant in training their inhabitants to work in factories and in helping them with advances in agricultural and medical fields and that by a special department in the Israeli Foreign Ministry which was established to guide activities in these countries. And through the strong willingness of Israelis to build these relationships, the Israelis were willing to explore any possible channel that could help them broaden their contacts with countries in this region and sought British help to achieve this goal. Walter Eytan, the General Director of the Israeli Foreign Office, told Sir Francis Rundall on 27 July 1957, that Her Majesty’s Government would be able to assist Israel in these matter, for example in its relations with Burma. He said that Israel had begun to establish good relations with that country, but then the Burmese had suddenly changed their attitude and he was suspicious that Britain was involved in this. In fact, the Foreign Office in London noted Israel’s relations with Asian and African countries quite favorably, and because of Israel’s
influence, as a pro-Western country, could work against that of communism and the pan-Arab movement. The benefit to Britain was that it assisted Israel to find an outlet for trade, thus avoiding the Arab boycott. If the boycott succeeded in bringing Israel’s economy to a standstill it would pose a danger to Middle East peace and therefore to Britain’s interests. In addition, the Foreign Office wished that the relationship between the African-Asian states and Israel would contribute to a decreasing of Israeli feelings of isolation and claustrophobia.


3.4-The impact of Suez war on Egypt

When the Suez crisis broke out in October 1956 there were 1,000 Jews locked up and 500 Jewish businesses were arrested by the government. And they known as "Zionists and enemies of the state" and this statement deemed as blackberry’s name which was read out in the mosques of Alexandria and Cairo. In addition the bank’s accounts of Jewish were expropriated also their job in Egypt was lost moreover they prevented to practice their jobs as Lawyers, engineers, doctors and teacher in the state and there were several of Jews retired the country. However they could take just suitcase and a small sum of cash and they obliged to sign handout in order to subscribe their possession to the Egyptian government. in these time Foreign observers announced that members of Jewish families were taken as hijacked persons in order to secure their leave from the country and as a result the majority of Jewish community were retired toward mainly for Europe, the United States and South America and Israeli and all that after Israeli obliged to sign the declaration that include their leave and expropriation of their properties and the same concern were applied against British and French nationals in reprisal for their aggression. whereas in the 1957 the Jewish inhabitant who live in Egypt had fallen 15,000. However the end of crisis granted an great view of his own power because according to him, he believed that he defeated the three tripartite (Britain
The main political impact of the Suez crisis on the British politics, Anthony Eden who demitted from the office on 1957 and accused of betrayal parliament and after a great pressure that paved by the President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the United States government, Anthony Eden barely remained prime minister for two year in the time of resignation. However, his failure in treating the Suez crisis outshined all what he had investigated in different government and objection roles in the previous 30 year. In these time his successor, Harold Macmillan tried to speed the decolonization and to regain the benevolence of the United State and. Thus the British foreign policy thinking became increasingly removed from acting as a great imperial power.

During the 1960 the prime minister Harold Wilson refused continuously support the American war in Vietnam by British troops in spite of Americans’ insistence all that because unwillingness of Americans to provide Britain during the Suez crisis. After the events that led to Eden’s resignation, Britain could enforce its military abroad without the support of the United State until the Falkland war in 1982. Thus and according to evidences of some the crisis noted a final power that transformed to new superpower that were the United States and the Soviet Union. Although unwillingness of United State to support Britain and in spite of suffering the British domestic policy, the relationship between United State and Britain did not undergo due to the final consequences of the Suez crisis. Thus the relationship between the Britain and United State after the Suez crisis became special and more active and revival. And according to Risse-Kappen "The two governments ... engaged in almost ritualistic reassurances that their 'special relationship' would be restored quickly."
Therefore Eisenhower at that time showed his repentance when he rejected the joining to British, French and Israeli in the crisis.

When Eisenhower demitted from his office he saw the Suez Crisis might his biggest foreign policy mistake not only that but he saw also United States contributed to invalidate the European allies in the cold war as well as he suggested Nasser to be a man who controlled the Arab world and in the following years some argued that real mistake during the Suez crisis was done by Eisenhower not Eden because Eisenhower in that time showed the west was divided and weak due to his refusal to reinforce his allies and his leaving the Soviet Union to exploit the position and when leadership failed to find solution to end the Suez crisis Eisenhower and United Nation didn’t care about the military campaign of Anglo-French against Egyptian and his reaction was muted and he showed the possibility of British and French troops to take canal although he was afraid to support his allies that might damage his successful in re-election as president .Through a visit of the UK Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd at the Walter Reed Hospital to Dulles in Washington ,he questioned Lloyd why he stop the war and why he did not complete Nasser’s defeat and the same thing to Eisenhower who showed and his secretary of state the identical note. (Suez crisis. (2011.) pp 13)

3.6-The impact the Suez Crisis on France

The relation among Franco-American never improved from the Suez crisis and that for different causes, in the fact, before the Suez crisis there were a tension which triggered and confused the relation between French and American because Paris deemed U.S as betrayal of the French war effort in Indochina at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. This event illustrated the weakness of the NATO alliance in alliance in its lack of planning and co-operation beyond the European stage. Generally the Suez crisis demonstrated the allies of France could not stand
with France such as Britain decided to ceasefire in midst of war without consulting French moreover to the political objection of Americans to. (Jakson.(1980): pp110-113)

3.7-The Suez Crisis’s winners and losers

According to Egypt, Nasser, the Egyptian leader become the hero of the Arab world because he challenge and got up against Britain and France who controlled the Middle east for a long time ,Jamal Abdel Nasser had obtained complete control of Suez canal and large quantity of British military supplies and due to the assistance of us the Suez canal reopened in 1957 and although Egypt lost territory when Israeli attacked Sinai , Israeli obliged by United State to withdraw in the early 1957 in addition Nasser declared that the defeating of Egyptian was turned back to the support of Britain and France for Israeli

However, the Israelis also made gains and their rapid triumph over Egyptian forces in Gaza and Sinai and that later proved that they had strongest Defense Forces in the Middle East. While to the Britain and France, they deemed as loser of the Suez war .Britain and France failed to regain control of the canal and they had failed to overthrow Nasser, thus the long period of Anglo-French domination of the Arab was ending.

Consequently the main effect of the Suez Crisis was to make many of the Arab state more anti-western than ever: not only had Britain and France tried to overthrow the government of the leading Arab nation ,but they had used Israel to do so .Now , more than before ,Israel looked like outpost of western imperialism. Also the Arab become more willing to seek soviet aid therefore the Soviet Union began to support most Egypt’s weapons and to pay for building of the Aswan dam and many other project .however, Nasser did not want Egypt to be tied to the Soviet Union and he was certainty not communist because he wanted Egypt and other state to be neutral. And in 1964 Jamal Abdel Nasser, invited the leader of
Arab state to conference in Cairo. Although many of them mistrusted each other, the one thing that united them all was opposition to the state of Israel and support for Palestinians (figure 2). (Scott (2012): pp6)
Summery planning of Suez crisis from the nationalization to the impact  
(Scott. (2012): pp6)

3.8-Conclusion

As a conclusion chapter three looks in the impacts of the Suez Crisis on super power and Britain /France, Egypt and Israel, for instance, according to Egypt Nasser become the hero of Arab world because he challenge and stood against Britain and France, however France and Britain they failed to regain the control of the Suez Canal and removing Nasser from the power but the superpower US created and used the Eisenhower doctrine which contained using the military forces if requested by any country in the middle east to check aggressors whereas Israel made gains and their rapid triumph over Egyptians in Gaza and Sinai that later proved they strongest defense forces in the Middle East.
Glossary:

**USSR**: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

**USA**: United State of America

**RCC**: Revolutionary Command Council

**IDF**: Israeli Defense Forces

**NATO**: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO is an organization to which many European countries and the US and Canada belonging. They agree to give each other military help if necessary.

**Isthmus**: A narrow strip of land with water on each side that joins two larger pieces of land.

**Peninsula**: An area of land that is most almost surrounded by water but is joined to a larger piece of land.

**Realpolitik**: A system of politics that is based on the actual situation and needs of a country or political party rather than on moral principles.

**The Entente Cordiale**: The friendly understanding reached between the British and French government in 1904, mainly about issues relating to their colonies around the world.

**Exchequer**: In Britain, the government department that controls public money.

**Feudalism**: The social system that existed during the Middle East Ages in European in which people were given land and protection by noblemen and had to work and fight for him in return.

**Joint Resolution**: (in the US) a decision that has been approved by the senate and the house of representative.
Claustophobia: An extreme fear of being in a small confined place; the unpleasant feeling that a person get in a situation which restrict them.

Congress: A large meeting or series of meetings where representatives from different groups decision ideas, make decisions.

The Truman Doctrine: A policy announced in 1947 by President Harry Truman in which he promised American financial and military help for Greece, Turkey and other countries threatened by communism.

Periphery treaty: The relation between the African and Asian stats and Israeli.

Moscow: A capital of Russia and it was capital of former Soviet Union.

Tel-El-Kabir: It is region in Egypt.

Lord Nelson:(Horato Nelson 1758-1805): an English admiral who become famous for winning a number of sea battle against the French in 1790. this victories strengthened British military power at sea and prevented napoleon‘s forces attacking Britain. Many people know that nelson lost his right arm and his right eye in different battle.

Benjamin Disraeli:(1804-81): a British conservative politician who was twice prime minister (1868 and 1874-80). he also wrote a number of popular novels which showed his interest in social change. he become leader of the conservative party in 1864 and created its modern central organization. as prime minister, he increased Britain’s influence abroad and he bought half of the Suez Canal for Britain, he also introduced improvement in housing for poor people in the cities.

William Ewart Gladstone :(1809-98); An English liberal politician who was prime minister four times (1868-1874,1880-1885,1892-94). he began as a Tory MP but left liberal party,
becoming its leader in 1867. He and his rival Disraeli were the leading figures in British politics for over 30 years.

**Joseph Chamberlain** : (1836-1914) A British liberal politician. He first became well known as the mayor of Birmingham, where he was responsible for many improvements to the city’s houses and service.

**Field Marshal Allenby**: The commander of the British Middle Eastern forces.

General Staff: Officer who advice a military leader and help to plan a military operation.

**Ernest Bevin (1881-1951)**: A British trade union leader and the labor politician. He established the TGWU and become its leader, during the Second World War he was minister of labor and national service, later as foreign secretary (1945-51) he played important part in creating NATO.


**Winston Churchill**: A politician who is remembered as one of Britain greatest statesmen, he was a member of parliament from 1900 to 1965 for five different constituencies.

**Dwight D Eisenhower**: (1890-1967) the 34th president of the US (1953-1961) and a famous general. He was a supreme commander of the allied forces in Second World War. Eisenhower was strongly against communism. He was a popular president and known for his friendly smile and mild manner.

**John Foster Dulles**: (1888-1959): AUS lawyer who become secretary of state (1953-9) under president Eisenhower. He developed a US foreign policy that was strongly opposed to the USS and communism, which he considered to be morally evil.
Anthony Eden (1897-1977): A conservative politician who had a long career, mostly in foreign affair, and become prime minister in 1955 when Winston Churchill retired, the following year the Suez crisis occurred and in January 1957 Eden resigned.

Eugene black: president of the World Bank during the Suez crisis.
General Conclusion:

The Suez Crisis, 1956 came to prove that the whole Middle East had indeed entered a new era of successive crises. The British-Egyptian struggle did not come to an end until the 1970’s. During this period, Britain could no more solve the political mess in the Middle East as it did before when its was at its peak of imperial power. The US flourished as the major player from the western bloc with its allies. Whereas, the USSR challenged western interests through different strong relations with local actors as well as with revolutionary movements. President Nasser came to be the hero of Arabs, and consequently, he played a significant role in the area throughout his rule up to the harsh defeat in the Six Days War of 1967. For Britain, The Suez Crisis marked the most influencing incident of its decline in the Middle East. After the crisis, Britain looked for an American partnership to deal with the new situation in the region. Moreover, the crisis marked the failure of British Foreign policy because it did not just fail to reach its goals, but still it caused a serious disagreement among the members of the western bloc, which was mainly concerned by the containment policies toward the USSR. Also Britain was proved to be forceless in its attempt to maintain its imperial status. Of course, not only the Suez Crisis which was the cause of Britain’s imperil status decline, but other factors played a significant role, such as its economic problems inherited from the Second World War and the immense losses in its empire, mainly the Indian subcontinent.

The USA did not emerge in the region from nowhere. The crisis emphasized its leading role in the region as its two important European allies were declining there. Though the US succeeded to some extent in playing the leading role, but the policy of containing the Soviet Union in the Middle East failed through the Eisenhower Doctrine. Thus, the US could not put the Egyptian leader down neither in Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq or in other
sensitive areas, of the Arab world, nor neutralizing him efficiently from the USSR. The US policy was to isolate Nasser from any possible ally in the area politically via subdividing old rivals of Nasser in the region unlike British policies which used arms and force.

The USSR relatively benefited from the situation by playing on the anti colonial sentiments of the Arabs as it very often considered capitalism as the highest stage of imperialism. The USSR, additionally, went on a more decisive policy via seeking economic and political success over the west mainly by Arm deals and great projects and investments. Both President Nasser and the USSR profited from each other to topple the western presence in the region.

In Egypt, despite the military defeat in the Suez War and its consequences on the economy of the country, The Egyptian leader successfully challenged western interests not only in the Suez Canal but also in almost all the countries of the region. He could do so as Arab Nationalism was in its peak. Nasser’s policy was to protect himself from all the attempts made by the west to isolate him from his allies in the region and to neutralize him from probable allies within the Eastern Bloc. Neither goals were achieved. Also, his attitudes made the Arabs afraid of possible direct interference in their affaires which created for him troubles in the area. Only the Six Days war put en end to his role. Yet, his experience remains the most significant in modern Arab history, for challenging the west.
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Résumé

Juste après la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, le monde savait des crises dramatiques. La crise de Suez, 1956, a été incontestablement l'une des plus graves événements de cette époque qui a changé irrévocablement l'histoire de l'ensemble du Moyen Orient ainsi que l'histoire du monde, car elle a créé de nouveaux pouvoirs régionaux et un nouveau ordre dans le monde.

Cette thèse vise à analyser les différents éléments de la politique étrangère Britannique en la mettant dans le contexte de la crise de Suez, 1956, en commençant par une brève analyse des origines et des évolutions des relations Anglo-égyptiennes. Ensuite, l'émergence du nouveau régime Égyptien sous la direction des Officiers libres en 1952 ainsi qu’une idée approfondie a propos des politiques et circonstances qui ont ouvert la voie à la crise. Dans Ce travail, L’accent est mis sur les impacts de la crise de Suez sur superpuissances, les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique, Israël, Egypte, Britain et France.