The American Foreign Policy Strategy towards Afghanistan
"from Containment to Nation"

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Option: Literature and Civilization.

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Dedication

I would like to dedicate this work to my family. There is no doubt that without its continued encouragements and supports, I would not have completed this work.

Nedjma dedicates this work to her friends and her sisters: Faiza, Soumaya and Samira for their encouragement.

I dedicates my work to my aunt Hamida.

To everyone has participated to make this work.

To the Students of LMD system.

And last but not least, this work is dedicated to our country Algeria.
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Abstract

This paper discusses the US Strategy that has been applied in Afghanistan from Containment to Nation Building. It shows that Afghanistan is located in the area which is important and vital to the American Strategy of Defense. This US Strategy towards Afghanistan changed from period to another according to the conditions but it served one goal which is to protect its own interests and defend its domestic as well as international security. Beginning with the Cold War era, the United States of America followed the Strategy of Containment towards Afghanistan in order to fight Communism. It provided Afghanistan with financial and military aid in order to defend its interests in the area. This American aid was given mainly to the mujahedeen among them Osama Bin Laden who later became the most dangerous enemy to the United States of America. After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan and the United States of America achieved its goals among them destroying the Soviet Union, the United States of America lost interests in Afghanistan until the 9/11 attacks on the American symbol which led to the declaration of the policy of “War on Terror”. This policy led to the American invasion of Afghanistan. This period represented the re-emergence of American interests in the country which were to destroy Taliban and capture Osama Bin Laden who was accused of committing these attacks and threatened the American national security. After the US invasion of Afghanistan the United States of America followed the Strategy of Nation Building in Afghanistan in order to destroy Taliban, prevent Afghanistan to become a safe shelter to the terrorists again, and rebuild the country within democratic principles.

Key Words: Strategy, Afghanistan, Containment, Nation Building, interests, the 9/11 attacks, security, War on Terror, Taliban, Osama Bin Laden,
الملخص

هذه الدراسة تعالج السياسة الاستراتيجية الأمريكية التي طبقت على أفغانستان منذ الحرب الباردة إلى مرحلة بناء الدولة الأفغانية وتوضح أن المنطقة تحمل موقع حيوي ومهم بالنسبة لاستراتيجية الدفاع الأمريكية. هذه الاستراتيجية الأمريكية نحو أفغانستان تغيرت من مرحلة إلى أخرى تبعاً للظروف والدوافع الأمريكية. لكن هدفها الأساسي هو حماية المصالح الأمريكية والحفاظ على الأمن الوطني الأمريكي والأمن الدولي. فمثلًا أثناء الحرب الباردة طبقت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية سياسة الاحتواء على أفغانستان وساعدتها مادياً للقضاء على الاحتلال الشيوعي السوفيتي. كان هدف تلك السياسة هو حماية المصالح الأمريكية في المنطقة وتمثلها في محاربة الانتشار الشيوعي. لكن هذه السياسة الأمريكية تغيرت خاصة بعد تفجيرات الحادي عشر من سبتمبر على برج التجارة العالمي. هذه الأخيرة أدت إلى الاحتلال الأمريكي لأفغانستان تحت سياسة الحرب على الإرهاب وذلك من أجل إلغاء القبض على طالبان المساعدة لأساس بن لادن المشتبه به دولياً بارتكاب هكذا التفجيرات الإرهابية. بعد الاحتلال الأمريكي لأفغانستان، ابعت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية سياسة بناء الدولة بهدف تدمير طالبان وبناء دولة أفغانستان ضمن مبادئ ديمقراطية لمنعها من الوقوع في أيدي الإرهابيين مرة أخرى.

Acronyms

AIG: Afghan Interim Government
AMF: The Afghan Ministry of Finance
ANA: Afghan National Army.
ANP: Afghan National Police.
ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DEA: Drug Enforcement Agency.
ECO: Economic Cooperation Organization
ERP: European Recovery Program
GDI: Gender related Development Index.
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
HDI: Human Development Index.
HPI: Human Poverty Index
ISI: Inter Services Intelligence
LCOSF: Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
NSDD: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)
OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom.
OIC: The Organization of the Islamic Conference
PDPA: The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Teams
SAARC: The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SALT II: Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SOF: Army Special Operation Forces.
UN: United Nations.
UNDP: United Nations Development Assistance Programme
USA: United States of America
USSR: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
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General Introduction

At the end of the Second World War, the world’s nations immediately found themselves involved in a new conflict of ideologies which is known as the Cold War between American Capitalism and the Russian Communism. The United States of America became convinced that the Soviet Union was planning to establish communist regimes around the world. As a result, it adopted the policy of Containment in which the United States of America used military, economic, and diplomatic strategies to cease the spread of Communism, protect American interests around the world, and increase America’s security and influence abroad. This policy was applied in many countries among them Afghanistan.

The American interest in Afghanistan has frequently changed from period to another according to the conditions and causes. Therefore, the US Strategy and policy in this region differentiated due to the interests and goals that the United States of America wanted to achieve. For instance, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, American policy makers worried that the Soviets were planning to control the Persian Gulf. In response to this event, the United States of America has followed a specific Strategy to support the Afghan guerrillas in fighting the Soviet invasion. In the late 1990s, the American interests have decreased in this country due to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. However, after the September 11 attacks, Afghanistan witnessed a great and direct American involvement in its domestic affairs. During the global war on terror, the United States of America applied many strategies toward Afghanistan. Until recently, the U.S government has failed to establish a long-term strategic vision for involvement in Afghanistan.
The approach taken in this paper is to divide the work into three chapters. The first chapter is an Overview about Afghanistan. It includes sub-elements, starting with background about Afghanistan and ending with modern Afghanistan’s political history since 1709. Second chapter discusses the US Cold War Strategy towards Afghanistan, starting with the Post-World War II period (1945-1978), followed by the period of Soviet occupation (1979-1989) and then ending with the post Soviet occupation period (1989-1992) up to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Concerning the last chapter refers to US Post-Cold War Strategy towards Afghanistan. It includes sub-elements, starting with the Afghan Civil War period (1992-96), followed by the Taliban rule (1996-2001), and the post September 11 Attacks period (2001-2009), and ending with the US Strategy of Nation Building in Afghanistan.

The division into the various time segments is based on different features of the periods, particularly as they shaped US policy. The first period represents the time when Afghanistan was still considered as an independent and self-governed country. The second period of the Cold War involves the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, first in supporting the Afghan communist coup and then during the ten-year Soviet occupation. The final Cold War segment involves the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of the Afghan communist government which had been supported by the Soviet Union for three years. The last three segments involve the aftermath of the anti-communist jihad, including the Afghan Civil War, the rise of radical Islamic influences, and the fall of the Taliban government and post 9/11 attacks.

**Definition of the issue**

This paper discusses the US Strategy toward Afghanistan from Containment to Nation Building. It examines the US Strategy and policy as it relates to the changing
situations in Afghanistan. The issue includes the changing level of interest from the Cold War era to the current Global War on Terror and the relationship to US Strategy and policy towards Afghanistan. Also, it discusses the US Strategy of Nation-building. So, what was the American Foreign Policy or Strategy that the United States of America has followed, toward Afghanistan from Containment to Nation Building? What are the goals of this Strategy? Or had the changing level of interest from the Cold War to the period of War on Terror affected US Strategy towards Afghanistan?

**Aim of the study**

This research presents a clarification and a description of the US Strategy and policy in Afghanistan from Containment to Nation Building in order to find out the influence of this policy in Afghanistan since the Cold War era to the present time. Also, we want to prove that Afghanistan is a unique political case which survived after the American Containment Strategy and dived into another political and religious conflict.

The aim of this study is to know the real goals of US Strategy and policy in Afghanistan whether it aims at pushing Afghanistan to progress and security or to realize American interests and strategic plans in the area. Moreover, this study aims at learning the lesson from the Afghanistan’s experience with the United States of America and avoiding the repetition of its mistakes in the future by knowing that there is no diplomatic relationship without a secret goal.

**Hypotheses**

The hypotheses of this study are as follows:
• The US Strategy towards Afghanistan might change throughout the time according to causes, conditions and situations.

• The US Strategy towards Afghanistan aimed at achieving certain interests.

• During the Cold war era, the United States of America perhaps followed the Strategy of Containment towards Afghanistan to achieve its goals.

• The September 11 attacks might be led to changing of US Strategy towards Afghanistan.

• It might be that the American invasion of Afghanistan led to another Strategy toward Afghanistan.

• If the problem of Afghanistan is still unsolved, it is because the area is still important to the US Strategy.

**Limitation of the study**

We limit this research from the period of Containment policy during the Cold War era to the period of US Nation Building Strategy which the United States of America adopted towards Afghanistan after the American invasion of Afghanistan. We chose to begin with the period of Containment Strategy because it represents the beginning of the American involvement in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs. Also, we chose the period from Containment to Nation Building because it represents the turning point in Afghanistan’s history.

**Methodology**

In the present study, we use the historical method because it fits the purpose of our study which is to present and describe US Strategy and policy in Afghanistan since the Cold War to the present time. In the historical method, we will organize and classify the
recorded evidence and events. This is usually followed by interpretations and analyses of these events and their relevance to the present circumstances. The purpose of the historical method is to discover generalizations and deductions that can be useful in understanding the past, the present and to limited extent can expect the future. We apply this method on Afghanistan because it helps to introduce historical facts and because we think that the method is the most appropriate to fit the issue.

Review of literature

There are great works and researches that discussed the US Strategy toward Afghanistan. In this review, the emphasis will be placed on the US Strategy toward Afghanistan from containment to nation-building.

- In a study of US Strategy, Burrough said that US strategy towards Afghanistan changed from period to another. He used the historical facts to prove his view.
- Mank and Oakland in their work “American Civilization”, said that the American foreign policy changed from isolationism to internationalism until the start of the Cold War in which the USA used the policy of Containment towards Afghanistan.
- In his case study of U.S. nation-state building operations in Afghanistan, Tindall said “In order to understand the complex issues of nation-state building in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, it is important to assess the U.S. foreign policy to the Middle-East for the last decade. The legacy of the Bush Administration’s approach to U.S. foreign policy largely includes the decision and execution of fighting the “War on Terror.”
Chapter One: An Overview about Afghanistan

Introduction

Afghanistan history, its internal political development, its foreign relations, and its existence as an independent state have been formed by its location at the crossroads of Central, West, and South Asia. The waves of migrating people who passed through the region in the ancient times left different ethnic and linguistic groups. This country became an independent nation until the twentieth century under Ahmad Shah Durrani. Afghanistan is a mountainous land-locked country located in Central Asia. It has a history and culture that goes back over 5000 years. Afghanistan’s recent history is characterized by invasions and regional Games. The country is still characterized by tribal and ethnic division. Its common identity was a consequence of decades of conflict with the British. Afghanistan has a history of a high degree of decentralization, and resistance to foreign invasion and occupation. Some have termed it the “graveyard of empires.”

I. Background about Afghanistan

1.1. Geography

Three main forces have shaped present day Afghanistan: Tribalism, Islam, and geography. They have permanent effects on Afghan society. The present-day Afghanistan and its people have been formed thanks to numerous empires and conquering states. It was so important because of its river basins and fertile valley and its location on the East-West trade routes, especially the Silk Route to China. This geographic factor has affected and changed the peoples of Afghanistan (Barracks 1).
Afghanistan literally means the 'Land of the Afghans' and has a variety of names applied to its general location in the past. Between the fall of the Taliban after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 Loya jirga, Afghanistan was called by the United States as the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan. Under its new constitution, the country is now officially named the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (“Afghanistan: Encyclopaedia-Afghanistan”).

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan have been an ancient focal point of the Silk Road and human migration. The country occupies an important geo-strategic location which connects the Middle East with Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent, which has been home to various people through the ages. The land has witnessed many military conquests since antiquity, especially by Alexander the Great, Chandragupta Maurya, and Genghis Khan (“Afghanistan”).

Afghanistan is a country at the crossroads of Asia. Geographically, it is usually placed in Central Asia, but it is also sometimes categorized within South Asia and the Middle East because it has cultural, ethno-linguistic, and geographic links with most of its neighbours such as Iran in the West, Pakistan in the South and East, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the North, and China to the East. Afghanistan area is about 251,825 square miles (647,500 square kilometres); it is the world's 41st largest country (“Afghanistan: Encyclopaedia-Afghanistan”).

This southwestern country bridges South and Central Asia, and connects the Middle East with the Far East. It is completely landlocked, with the nearest coast stretching along the Arabian Sea, about 300 miles to the South. Its longest border is with Pakistan, to the East and South. It reaches about 1,125 miles (1,810 Kilometers). The 510-mile (821km) border in the West separates Afghanistan from Iran, and there is a 200-mile border with the
part of Jammu and Kashmir claimed by Pakistan. The length of Afghanistan's northern border with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan is 1,050 miles. The shortest border is with the Sinkiang region of the People's Republic of China. It is about 50 miles. The capital of Afghanistan is Kabul which is located in the East-Central part of the country at an altitude of about 5,900 feet (1,800 meters) and it is its the largest city. The city is connected by road to most Afghan provinces and neighbouring countries. The boundaries of Afghanistan were established in the late 19th century because of the competition between the British Empire and Russia. The major cities of Afghanistan are its capital Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad, Mazar-e Sharif and Kandahar (“Afghanistan: Encyclopaedia – Afghanistan”).

Afghanistan is a landlocked and mountainous country, with plains in the north and southwest. It lies between latitudes 29° and 39° N, and longitudes 60° and 75° E. Afghanistan's highest point is Nowshak, at 7,485 m (24,557 ft) above sea level. (“Afghanistan”).

The country frequently faces the minor earthquakes, especially in the northeast of Hindu Kush mountain areas. Some 125 villages were damaged and 4,000 people killed by the May 31, 1998, earthquake (“Afghanistan”).

The Hindu Kush Mountains are the main topographic feature that marks Afghanistan. These mountains are a barrier between the Northern Province and the rest of Afghanistan. They divide the country into three distinct geographic areas: the central highlands, the northern plains, and the southwestern plateau (Barracks 6).

The central highlands are an area of about 160,000 square miles. This part of Afghanistan has deep, narrow valleys, as well as high mountains, which have been
historically important to the defense of the country. The Khyber Pass, one of the most famous routes to the Indian subcontinent, is located in the mountain ranges of the central highlands. The climate of the central highland is usually dry, with temperatures in the summer averaging around 80 degrees Fahrenheit; the winters are very cold.

The Southern Plateau consists of high plateaus and sandy deserts. This desolate region covers about 50,000 square miles and is crossed by several large rivers. The average altitude of the southern plateau is about 3,000 feet. Kandahar (Qandahar), at an elevation of about 3,500 feet, enjoys a dry, but mild climate.

The northern plains are about 40,000 square miles of extremely fertile foothills and plains. The Amu River (formerly called the Oxus River) runs through the foothills of this region. The average elevation is about 2,000 feet. Agriculture is the main occupation in this region. There are large amounts of mineral deposits and natural gas in the northern plains (Barracks 7).

Afghanistan’s principal rivers are the Amu Darya, 800 kilometers; the Harirud, 850 kilometers; the Helmand, 1000 kilometers; and the Kabul, 460 kilometers. Afghanistan’s main tributaries to the Amu Darya, which forms much of the country’s northern border, are the Koshk and the Qonduz (“Country Profile: Afghanistan” 5).

Concerning the climate, it changes rapidly from one region to other. Large parts of the country are dry, and fresh water supplies are limited. The endorheic Sistan Basin is one of the driest regions in the world (“Afghanistan”).

The climate of Afghanistan varies dramatically between the mountain countries and the lowlands. In the southwest during summer the temperature can reach 120 degrees Fahrenheit. In the Hindu Kush mountains during winter it can fall as low as –15 degrees
The nation has a continental climate with very harsh winters in the central highlands, the glaciated northeast (around Nuristan) and the Wakhan Corridor, where the average temperature in January is below 15 °C (5.0 °F), and hot summers in the low-lying areas of Sistan Basin of the southwest, the Jalalabad basin of the east, and the Turkistan plains along the Amu River of the North, where temperatures average over 35 °C (95 °F) in July.

The country does not face any water shortage because it receives huge amounts of snow during winter which transforms to water that runs into rivers, lakes, and streams, but most of its national water flows to neighboring states. The state needs around 2 billion dollar to rehabilitate its irrigation systems (“Afghanistan”).

The nation's natural resources include gold, silver, copper, zinc, uranium, and iron in the Southeast; precious and semi-precious stones (such as lapis, emerald, and azure) in the Northeast; and significant petroleum and natural gas reserves in the North. Afghanistan is known to have major deposits of chrome, coal, copper, iron, and salt. Substantial oil deposits are recognized but not yet quantified. Agricultural resources are primarily grazing land; fertile crop-growing land is concentrated in Kondoz Province in the north and Helmand Province in the south (“Country Profile: Afghanistan”).

I.2. Afghanistan's population

Afghanistan has a population of 30 million people, although this remains an estimate as an official census has not been taken for decades. In July 2010, the population of Afghanistan is around 28,395,716, among them 3 million Afghan refugees living in Pakistan and Iran (“Afghanistan: Encyclopaedia-Afghanistan”).
In the early 2000s, population assessment was difficult because many people have not fixed residences. In 2008, the population was 32.7 million. The population growth rate was 2.6 percent per year. The population is approximately 75 percent rural. In 2008 the six most populous cities accounted for less than 10 percent of the population. In 2006 net out-migration was 0.4 per 1,000 populations. After heavy out-migration and internal displacement in the 1980s and 1990s, about 2.5 million Afghans returned to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2004. The United Nations reported that in 2007 some 365,400 Afghanis returned to their country. Pakistan and Iran are the main recipients of Afghan refugees. In 2007 more than 2 million Afghans were living in Pakistan and 1.5 million in Iran. In 2007 both countries began preparations for large-scale deportation. Tajikistan closed its border with Afghanistan in 2007. Meanwhile, in that year insecurity in Afghanistan decreased the rate of return. In the early 2000s, hundreds of thousands were internally displaced within Afghanistan, mainly from rural to urban areas, because of drought and instability. In the first quarter of 2008, about 13,000 people fled because of the conflicts occurred in their regions (“Country Profile: Afghanistan” 6).

The only city in Afghanistan with over two million residents is its capital, Kabul. It is followed by other major cities such as Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, Jalalabad, Ghazni, Kunduz, and Farah. Urban areas characterize by rapid population growth (“Afghanistan”).

1.2.1. Demography

In 2008 some 44.6 percent of the population was younger than 15 years of age, and 2.4 percent was older than 64. The birth rate was 45.8 per 1,000 populations, and the death rate was 19.6 per 1,000 populations. The infant mortality rate was 155 deaths per 1,000 live births. Life expectancy was 44.2 years for males and 44.4 years for females (“Country Profile: Afghanistan” 6).
I.2.2. Ethnic groups

As a landlocked nation, Afghanistan is at the crossroads for much migration and many settlements. Afghanistan's complex ethnic mix is a product of the way its borders were drawn up. It is a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual society, reflecting its location astride historic trade and invasion routes between Western Asia, Central Asia, and Southern Asia. The population of the country is divided into a wide variety of ethno linguistic groups (Barracks 10).

Recent surveys list 55 ethnic groups in total. The population of the non-Pashtun groups was augmented by refugees (muhajirin) who fled from the Soviet Union following the collapse of the anti-Bolshevik Basmachi movement in the 1920s and from Stalin's forced collectivisation in the 1930s. Inevitably many of these peoples in northern Afghanistan were hostile to all forms of socialist propaganda as a result (Mather 96).

The population of Afghanistan is divided into a wide variety of ethnic groups. The majority of Afghanistan's population consists of Iranian and Turkic people. There are also smaller groups include: Pashai, Brahuis, Pamiris, Kyrgyz, Arabs, Gujjars, Qezelbash and few others (“Demographics of Afghanistan”).

The main ethnic groups are Pashtun, 42 percent; Tajik, 27 percent; Hazara, 9 percent; Uzbek, 9 percent; Aimak (a Persian-speaking nomadic group), 4 percent; Turkmen, 3 percent; and Baloch, 2 percent. The Pashtuns are the major ethnic group in the south and the east, the Tajiks in the northeast. The predominant groups in north-central Afghanistan are the Hazaras, Tajiks, and Uzbeks (“Country Profile: Afghanistan” 6).
1.2.3. Language

Most Afghans are bilingual. The two official languages of Afghanistan are Pashto and Dari (Afghan Persian or Eastern Farsi). Both are Indo-European languages from the Iranian languages sub-family (“Afghanistan”).

Pashto is the native tongue of the Pashtuns, the single largest ethno-linguistic group within Afghanistan. The Pashtu language is written in a modified Arabic script. It is often referred to as the language of business and commerce. It is spoken widely in the South, East and South West of the country. The Afghan National Anthem is only in the Pashto language (Barracks 11).

Dari is the most common second language. Persian has always been the language of prestige. Persian is the native tongue of various Afghan ethnic groups including the Tajiks, the Hazara, Aimak and Kizilbash (“Demographics of Afghanistan”).

About 11% of the population speaks a Turkic language, mainly Uzbek or Turkmen. Afghanis living close to the border of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan probably speak Turkic languages. Uzbek language and Turkmen language are spoken in parts of the North (Barracks 11).

Other languages, such as Uzbek, Turkmen, Balochi, Pashayi and Nuristan languages are used as native tongue by minority groups across the country and have official status in the regions where they are widely spoken. Minor languages also include Pamiri, Brahui, Hindko, Kyrgyz, etc. Many of Afghans can also speak and understand Urdu, Punjabi, Hindi and English (“Demographics of Afghanistan”).

More than 30 languages and dialects are spoken in Afghanistan. Dari is spoken by 50
percent of the population, and Pashtu is spoken as a first language by 35 percent. Turkic languages (primarily Turkmen and Uzbek) are spoken by 11 percent of the population. Of the languages spoken by smaller segments of the population, the most important are Balochi and Pashai. Many Afghans speak more than one language; Dari is the most common second language (“Country Profile: Afghanistan” 6)

I.2.4. Religions

Afghanistan has been Muslim since 882 after Arab invasions converted local populations from Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and Hinduism. Islam is the religion of 99.7% of the total population of Afghanistan. About 80-89% of the population practices Sunni Islam while 10-19% is Shi'a. The remaining 1% or less practices other religions such as Sikhism, Hinduism and Buddhism. Christians are estimated about 500 to 8000 persons, there are no Christian or Jewish schools and there is only one church. Sikh and Hindu are about 3000 persons and Buddhist is small numbers, most of them foreigners (Katzman 4).

Small numbers of Hindus and Sikhs live in urban centers. Up until the mid-1980s, there were about 50,000 Hindus and Sikhs living in different cities, mostly in Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Ghazni. With the fall of the Taliban a number of Sikhs have returned to the Ghazni, Nangarhar, Kandahar and Kabul Provinces of Afghanistan (“Country Profile: Afghanistan” 7).

Afghanistan was home to a Jewish minority, numbering approximately 5,000 in 1948. Most Jewish families immigrated to Israel and the United States after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and only one individual remains today called Zablon Simintov (“Demographics of Afghanistan”).
1.2.5. Education and Literacy

Although large improvements were organized during the reign of Mohammad Zahir Shah (1933–73), it was about 90 percent of Afghanistan’s population was illiterate in 1979. In 2006, it was estimated that 57 percent of men and 87 percent of women were illiterate, and the lack of skilled and educated workers was the main economic problem (“Country Profile: Afghanistan” 7).

Beginning with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the wars destroyed the education system. Most teachers escaped from the country during the Soviet occupation and the Civil War. By 1996 only about 650 schools were working in the correct way. In 1996 the Taliban regime has forbidden education for females, and the madrassa became the main source of primary and secondary education. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the Interim Government received large international aid to improve the education system, but the Taliban remained attacking public schools especially in 2007 which led to the closure of 35 percent of the schools in the Southern provinces. The Taliban opened some fundamentalist schools in regions that they controlled. In 2004 and 2005, informal community education programs began in nine provinces. In 2008, about 9,500 schools were operating. In 2006, The Ministry of Education estimated that 8 million children were in school, including nearly 3 million girls. Although the government emphasizes on educating girls, the rate of girls to boys in secondary schools was one to three or four in 2008. This phenomenon is because the rural families follow the tradition of educating only males. Since the end of the Taliban era in 2001, public school programs have included religious subjects, but without details (“Country Profile: Afghanistan” 8).

In 2003, it was estimated that 30% of Afghanistan's 7000 schools had been damaged during more than two decades of Soviet occupation and Civil War. Only half of the schools
were reported to have clean water, while less than an estimated 40% had adequate sanitation. Education for boys was not a priority during the Taliban regime (“Afghanistan: Encyclopedia –Afghanistan”).

According to 2008 census, literacy rate is 28% of the population over 15 years of age. Children who could attend the school were estimated at 5.7 million (35% are girls). About 300,000 children in the south cannot attend school due to violence and poverty and nearly 8,000 schools were built (Katzman 3).

Higher education also has been problematic. When Kabul University reopened in 2002, about 24,000 students including both male and female enrolled. In the early 2000s, the improvement of five other universities was very slowly. Although seven universities were operating in 2007, only 22,700 students were active in Higher Education (“Country Profile: Afghanistan” 7).

Literacy rate of the population is estimated at 36%, Male Literacy rate is 51% and female literacy is 21%. The male is higher because Taliban laws prevented the education of women. However, the Government are always organizing campaigns against illiteracy (“Afghanistan: Encyclopedia –Afghanistan”).

I.2.6. Welfare

In the early 2000s, Afghanistan had the highest proportion of widows and orphans in the world because of the military conflict that lasted for a long time. For instance it was nearly 1.6 million in 2005. Moreover, it has large numbers of disabled individuals and former members of regional militias who are not given any support. In 2006 the British Department for International Development estimated that 70 percent of Afghans were living by less than 2 US dollar per day. The government has provided very little welfare
protection. Most of the welfare activity in the country has been provided by international
NGOs, such as the Afghan Health and Development Services, Afghan Women’s Education
Centre, and Humanitarian Assistance for the Women and Children of Afghanistan, and by
United Nations organizations (“Country Profile: Afghanistan” 8).

1.3. Afghanistan's Economy

Afghanistan is a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). As of 2009, the nation's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) exchange rate stands at 14 billion dollar and the GDP per capita is 1000 dollar. Its unemployment rate is 35% and 36% of its citizens live below the poverty line. Two-thirds of the population live on less than 2 dollar per day. The drought added to the nation's difficulties in 1998–2001 (“Afghanistan”).

Economic statistics for Afghanistan are inexact. Afghanistan is one of the poorest nations in the world. Its economy always has been agricultural and over 75% of its citizens work in the agricultural sector. It was destroyed by the wars of the 1980s and the 1990s. Industry depended on agricultural output. Due to the infusion of multi-billion dollars in international assistance and investments, and the improvements in agricultural production, the economy has improved, growing at approximately 12 percent per year during the past six years. In 2007 some 17 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) led by Western civilian and military personnel were working to restore economic infrastructure and security in Afghanistan (“Country Profile: Afghanistan” 8).

Since 2001, Economic improvement which included the recovery of the agriculture sector, and the large growth in the services sector, has been based on large international
aid. The London Conference on Afghanistan of 2006 promised to give about 10.4 billion dollar for economic infrastructure reconstruction during the following three years. In 2008, President Hamid Karzai announced a new five-year National Development Strategy, which included economic and social strategies, and was supported by 50 billion dollar of foreign funds. Many countries at the International Conference supported Afghanistan and provided 21 billion dollar for this program (“Country Profile: Afghanistan” 9).

The country's estimated GDP was 21.5 billion dollar in 2003, a 28.6% growth over 2002. Among the 232 listed countries in the CIA Fact book, Afghanistan ranks 108th in terms of GDP, this means per capita income of 800 dollar. A brief comparison shows that Afghanistan is the poorest country among its neighbours. Afghanistan is known for producing some of the finest pomegranates, grapes, apricots, melons, and several other fresh and dry fruits, including nuts. One-third of the nation’s GDP came from growing illegal drugs during the mid 2000s. The Afghan government began programs to reduce the cultivation of poppy and in 2010 it was reported that 24 out of the 34 provinces do not cultivate poppy (“Afghanistan”).

The government had a central budget of only 350 million dollar in 2003 and 550 million dollar in 2004. The country's foreign exchange reserves about 500 million dollar. Revenue is mostly produced through customs, as income and corporate tax bases are neglected (“Afghanistan: Encyclopaedia –Afghanistan”).

The Afghan Ministry of Finance (AMF) is focusing on improved revenue collection and public sector expenditure discipline. Since 2003, over sixteen new banks have opened in the country, including Afghanistan International Bank, Kabul Bank, Azizi Bank, Pashtany Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, First Micro Finance Bank, and others. The "Afghani" is the national currency (“Afghanistan”).
All these improvements are considered as the basis for the nation better future. Now, the majority of the population suffer from insufficient food, clothing, housing, medical care, and other problems caused by military operations and political uncertainties. The government is not strong enough to collect customs duties from all the provinces due to the power of the warlords. Fraud is widespread and corruption is common within Afghan government (‘‘Afghanistan: Encyclopaedia –Afghanistan’’).

Afghanistan faces many economic challenges. For example, it should replace the income produced by opium production, which provided 53 percent of the country’s Gross Product in 2006. Smuggling also is an important part of the “black economy,” which weakened the Afghanistan’s economy. Regional difference of wealth has been severe. Since 2001, Herat has shown too large economic growth compared to all other cities (“Country Profile: Afghanistan” 10).

Afghanistan played a major role as the world’s largest opium producer. Until now, the majority of Afghan opium production had been concentrated in the territory that Taliban has controlled. Although the country faces a long period of drought, and continuing Civil War, it remains the world’s major producer of opium poppy. The Taliban, which controls 96 percent of the territory where poppy is grown, developed poppy cultivation to buy weapons and to support military operations financially. Expanding poppy cultivation and a growing opium trade is huge problem for the country. The CIA estimates that one-third of the country’s GDP comes from opium export. this is one of Kabul's most serious policy and law-enforcement challenges, but also one of the world's most serious problems (Perl 1-2 ).

Inflation had been a major problem until 2002. However, the Afghani became less valuable in 2002 after the introduction of the new notes (which replaced 1,000 old Afghani
by 1 new Afghani) coupled with the stability compared to previous periods has helped prices to stabilise and also decrease between December 2002 and February 2003, reflecting the turnaround appreciation of the new afghani currency (“Afghanistan :Encyclopaedia – Afghanistan”).

In short, the Afghan economy is currently witnessing a big change period. On the one hand, there are encouraging signs of positive development and increasing wealth creation and management. But on the other hand, the security situation, the war against terrorism and the opium problem have created tall barriers for Afghanistan to rejoin the international community in prosperity and economic development (“Afghanistan :Encyclopaedia – Afghanistan”).

II. Modern Afghanistan’s Political History since 1709

Afghanistan’s land has witnessed many military conquests since antiquity, notably by Alexander the Great, Chandragupta Maurya, and Genghis Khan. It also served as a source from which local dynasties such as the Saffarids, Ghaznavids, Ghurids, Timurids, Moghul, and many others have established their empires. The political history of modern Afghanistan began in the 18th century with the rise of the Pashtun tribes when in 1709 the Hotaki dynasty rose to power in Kandahar and Ahmad Shah Durrani established the Durrani Empire in 1747. The capital of Afghanistan was shifted in 1776 from Kandahar to Kabul and part of its territory was ceded to neighboring empires by 1893. In the late 19th century, Afghanistan became a buffer state in the "Great Game" between the British and Russian empires. On August 19, 1919, the nation regained control over its foreign policy from the British (“Afghanistan”).
II.1. Hotaki Dynasty and the Durrani Empire (1709-1826)

From the death of Nadir Shah in 1747 until the communist coup of April 1978, Afghanistan was governed by Pashtun rulers of the Abdali tribe. Moreover, it was under the leadership of the first Pashtun ruler, Ahmad Shah that Afghanistan began to be a nation after centuries of separations and rule by invaders (Nyrop and Seekins 13-14).

In the eighteenth, the Ghilzai Pashtuns had rebelled against Iranian rule, but they had been subdued and ruled by Nadir Shah. However, the Abdali Pashtun established political dominance, starting in the middle of the eighteenth century with the rise of Ahmad Shah. Two groups within the Abdali ruled Afghanistan from 1747 until the collapse of the monarchy in the 1970s: the Sadozai of the Popalzai tribe and the Muhammadzai of the Barakzai tribe (Nyrop and Seekins 14).

The territory was divided between the Safavid dynasty of Persia and the Mughal Empire of India. Mir Wais Hotak who is an influential Afghan tribal leader of the Ghilzai tribe, gathered supporters and rebelled against the Persian Safavids in the early 18th century. Mir wais Khan overthrew and killed Gurgin Khan who is the Safavid governor of Kandahar, and made the Afghan region independent. By 1713, Mir wais had defeated two Persian armies, which were sent by Soltan Hosein who is the Safavid King from Isfahan (now Iran), to re-take control of the Kandahar region. Mir wais died in 1715. In 1722, his son Mahmud led an Afghan army to the Persian capital of Isfahan and proclaimed himself a ruler of Persia. The Persians refused to recognize the Afghan ruler, and after the massacre of thousands of Persian religious scholars, nobles, and members of the Safavid family, the Hotaki dynasty was forced to leave Persia during the Battle of Damghan (“Afghanistan”).

In 1738, Nader Shah and his army captured Kandahar from the last Hotak ruler; in the
same year he occupied Ghazni, Kabul and Lahore. In June 1747, Nadir Shah was killed by one of his officers and his kingdom fell apart (Nyrop and Seekins 14).

Modern states of Afghanistan began to be formed by Ahmed Shah in the eighteenth century after the killing of Nadir shah of Iran whose empire had included Pathans, Turkomans, Uzbeks and Hazars who lived between the deserts of Eastern Iran and the North-West frontier of the British in India (Calvocoressi 493).

Ahmad Shah Abdali called for a loya Jirga (grand assembly) to select a leader among his people, and in October 1747 the Pashtuns gathered near Kandahar and chose him as their new head of state. Ahmad was the second son of the chief of the Sadozai. With his brother, he had rebelled against Nadir Shah and had been jailed by the Ghilzai in Qandahar. Finally, he had been released by Nadir Shah in 1738 when he took the city from the Ghilzai. During the Iranian monarch, Ahmad became the commander of an elite body of Afghan cavalry. When Nadir Shah was killed by a group of officers, Ahmad and some of his cavalrymen escaped with the treasury of Nadir Shah (Nyrop and Seekins 14).

Ahmad Shah Durrani is regarded as the founder of modern Afghanistan. He was given the title “Durr-i-Durran” (meaning “pearl of pearls” or “pearl of the age”) and the Abdali tribe became known as the Durrani tribe. By 1751, Ahmad Shah Durrani and his Afghan army conquered the entire present-day Afghanistan, Pakistan, Khorasan and Kohistan provinces of Iran, along with Delhi in India. He defeated the Sikhs of the Maratha Empire in the Punjab region nine times; one of the biggest battles was the 1761 Battle of Panipat. In October 1772, Ahmad Shah returned to his home in Kandahar where he died. He was succeeded by his son, Timur Shah Durrani, who shifted the capital of their Afghan Empire from Kandahar to Kabul. Timur died in 1793 and was succeeded by his son Zaman Shah Durrani (20).
The quarrels among Timur’s descendants over authority led Afghanistan to an instability and the intervention of outside forces in the country for the first time since its unification under Ahmad Shah in 1747 (20).

The efforts of the Sadozai heirs of Timur to impose a true monarchy on the savage Pashtun tribes and to rule absolutely and without the advice of the other Pashtun tribes’ leaders were unsuccessful. The accession of Zeman was the beginning of a long quarrel that ended with the deposition of the Sadozai by the Muhammadzai, who were of the largest and most powerful descent of the Barakzai. The Sikhs caused trouble and Zeman made the mistake of appointing a young Sikh chief Ranjit Singh, as his governor in the Punjab. Ranjit Singh became a dangerous enemy of Pashtun rulers in Afghanistan. In 1809, the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh rebelled and took from the Afghans a large part of the Kingdom of Kabul (present day Pakistan). The Sikh Empire invaded the Afghan territory, reaching the city of Jalalabad (20-21).

The overthrow of Zeman in 1800 was not the end of civil struggle in Afghanistan; it was the beginning of greater violence. Shah Mahmud’s rule, who is Zeman’s older brother, lasted three years and was replaced by Timur Shah’s son Shuja who ruled from 1803 to 1809. After signing an agreement with the British in 1809, Shuja was replaced by Mahmud whose second reign lasted until 1818. Mahmud’s downfall in 1818 was the result of his foolish behaviour (Nyrop and Seekins 21).

From 1818 until the dominance of Dost Mohammad in 1826, chaos was dominant in the domains of Ahmad Shah’s Afghanistan. Afghanistan divided into a group of small units, each of them ruled by a different Durrani leader. Mahmud and Kamran controlled Herat, where they later acknowledged the sovereignty of the Iranian monarch. Mahmud died in 1829, and his heir Kamran ruled the city until he was killed in 1842. Different sons
II.2. Barakzai Dynasty and European Influence (1826–1973)

When Fateh Khan had captured the Durrani province of Herat, he attempted to remove the ruler Mahmud Shah. In the attempt to take the city from its Durrani ruler, his brother Dost Mohammad Khan and his men removed Fateh Khan from power who was later executed. Dost Mohammad Khan took control of Kabul in 1826 (“Afghanistan”).

In 1826, Dost Mohammad took control of Kabul and became emir, not shah. The obtaining of the interests and the practice of the Great Game appeared clearly during the reign of Dost Mohammad. The Great Game involved the confrontation of two great empires whose spheres of influence moved closer to one another until they met in Afghanistan and the repeated attempts by a foreign power to impose a puppet government in Kabul. Dost Mohammad ruled at the beginning of the Great Game, a century-long contest for domination of Central Asia and Afghanistan between Russia, which was expanding to the South, and Britain, which was intent on protecting India (“Country Profile: Afghanistan” 1).

In 1834, the Sikhs extended westward. Dost Mohammad demanded from the British to help him to fight the Sikhs. This demand represented the first stage of British intervention in Afghanistan. The British responded that he would send a commercial mission to Kabul. During this period, both Britain and Russia wanted to control over the small independent states that locate between them (Nyrop and Seekins 23).

For the first time, the British had interfered India in 1612. As a result, in 1801 the British signed an agreement with Iran to stop any possible Afghan moves into India by attacking their Western side and to prevent the French from doing the same thing because
in 1807 Napoleon signed with Russia the Treaty of Tilsit in which they planned to occupy India through Iran (23-24).

In the first decades of the nineteenth century, it became clear to the British that the major threat to their interests in India is not the separated Afghan empire, the weak Persians, or the French, but the Russians who had begun an advance southward from the Caucasus. The Russians feared permanent British encroachment into Central Asia when the British moved northward, taking control of the Punjab, Sind, and Kashmir. At the same time, the British viewed Russian intervention in the Caucasus and Georgia, Kirghiz and Turkmen lands, and Khiva and Bukhara as a threat to British interest in the Indian subcontinent. This led to the confrontation of these two great powers in the region (24).

In the 1830, when an alliance developed between Russia and Persia, the British invaded Afghanistan and imposed a king of their choice there. This led to the first Anglo-Afghan War from 1839 to 1842. Afghans began a jihad against the British who were forced to leave Kabul (Mather 93-94).

The British changed their policy with the Afghans. Rather than trying to impose a king of their choice, they provided the existing one with financial aids. When Dost Mohammed returned from India, he broke all ties with Russia concerning financial aids. Over the following several decades he and his successor attempted to re-establish state control over the country, especially in the non-Pashtun areas to the North and the West (94-95).

During the 19th century Afghanistan ceded much of its territory and autonomy to Pakistan. Ethnic Pashtun territories were divided by the 1893 Durand Line which led to confused relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In that period, The United Kingdom
had has a strong influence on Afghanistan’s authority ("Afghanistan").

The Russian military conquests in central Asia after 1865 convinced the British to reoccupy the country in 1878, causing the second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80). The British forced the Afghans to accept the Treaty of Gandamak, which made the country a British protectorate for forty years. The British were forced to withdraw after eighteen months. They recognised a new king, Abdur Rahman, and provided him with money and arms (Mather 95).

While Abdel Rahman was imposing order internally, Britain negotiated with Russia and drew up Afghanistan's northern borders during the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 without consulting the Afghans as well as it demarcated Afghanistan's borders with Persia and India. These borders made Afghanistan as a buffer state which stood between the limits of the British and Russian empires. The British have neglected the historical or ethnic frontiers of the region. For instance, the Durand Line which was drawn up in 1893 to demarcate Afghanistan and India had divided the Pashtun tribes. The Afghans never accepted the Durand Line, and after the formation of Pakistan in 1947 it was the basis of Afghan claims for a reunited Pashtunistan within Afghan borders (95-96).

On February 20, 1919, Habibullah was killed. His son, Amanullah decided to seize power. The 10 years of Amanullah’s reign were a period of dramatic change in Afghanistan in foreign and domestic politics.

Amanullah’s dramatic changes in foreign policy began when he had ascended the throne. Amanullah suddenly attacked the British in May 1919. The third Anglo-Afghan war did not last long and both start to make negotiations (Nyrop and Seekings 41).

The British dictated the terms of the 1919 Rawalpindi Agreement that provide for
Afghan autonomy in foreign affairs. Before the end of these negotiations in 1921, Afghanistan had already begun to establish its own foreign policy, including diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1919 (42).

King Amanullah began to finish his country's isolation after the Third Anglo-Afghan War and the independence. He established diplomatic relations with many states such as the Soviet Union in 1919; Iran in 1921; Britain, Turkey, and Italy in 1922; and France in 1923 and introduced several reforms to modernize his nation. Some of the reforms such as the abolition of the traditional Muslim veil for women and the opening of co-educational schools were not accepted by many tribal and religious leaders. Faced with armed opposition, Amanullah Khan was forced to leave the authority in January 1929 after Kabul fell to rebel forces led by Habibullah Kalakani. Prince Mohammed Nadir Shah, who is Amanullah's cousin, defeated and killed Habibullah Kalakani in October 1929. He was declared King Nadir Shah. He abandoned the reforms of Amanullah, thinking of more gradual stages of modernization. In 1933, he was killed (Mather 98).

Modern Afghanistan has been governed by the Pathans of the South east. It has a few natural resources and a medieval fiscal system. Since the parliament refused to impose taxes on land, public revenue was derived from customs duties which were small. Mohammad Zahir Shah who came to the throne in 1935 wanted to make a progress, but he faced obstacles by the parliament which was not strong to dismiss or manipulate (Calvocoressi 494).

Mohammed Zahir Shah who is Nadir Shah's son ruled from 1933 to 1973. Until 1946 Zahir Shah ruled with the assistance of his uncle who worked as Prime Minister and continued the policies of Nadir Shah. Another of Zahir Shah's uncles, Shah Mahmud Khan became Prime Minister in 1946 and began practicing a greater political freedom. In 1953,
he was replaced by Mohammed Daoud Khan, the king's cousin and brother-in-law. Daoud sought a closer relationship with the Soviet Union and a more distant one towards Pakistan. In 1973, Daoud Khan, Zahir Shah's brother-in-law, started a coup and became the first President of Afghanistan when Zahir Shah was visiting Europe. The monarchy was abolished and a new republic started. Daoud Khan tried to apply some reforms especially in the economic sector.

Moreover, Afghanistan was not a participant in World War II and remained neutral. It has not supported any power bloc in the Cold War. However, it had a benefit of building Afghanistan's main highways, airports and other vital infrastructure thanks to the Soviet Union and the United States competition for influence on the nations. These activities had obvious strategic significance ("Country Profile: Afghanistan" 2).
Figure 1. Geographic Map of Afghanistan

Source: (Katzman 90).
Conclusion

Modern Afghanistan was created in the nineteenth century as a buffer state between the Russian and British empires when they played their "Great Game" in the region. This historical circumstance with the country's threatening mountainous area made the invasion of Afghanistan difficult for the imperialist countries and also resulted in little economic development. Although the country was never colonised, the Modern Afghanistan State was the product of the struggle and collusion between the British and the Russian with the collaboration of the local rulers, in what the British called the "Great Game" of rivalry throughout the nineteenth century.
Chapter Two: US Cold War Strategy towards Afghanistan

Introduction

As the world began to see peace attempts after the end of the catastrophe of the Second World War, the new power blocs started to separate the world into opposite spheres of influence. The world experienced the rise of the Second Cold War. As a consequence, smaller nations engaged in wars that were usually bloody and violent and served the new power blocs. Afghanistan is one of the examples of the nations that witnessed the struggle of the Cold War on its land especially by the USA and the USSR.

I. Cold War Era: 1945-1979

I.1. Afghanistan’s United States Relations before the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

The first contact between Afghanistan and the United States occurred in 1830s when Josiah Harlan, an American adventurer and political activist from the Philadelphia area of Pennsylvania, traveled to the Indian subcontinent. He intended to become the King of Afghanistan. It was during the time when the British Indian army invaded Afghanistan, during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1838-1842) when Afghan kings Shuja Shah Durrani and Dost Mohammad Khan were fighting for the throne of the Durrani Empire. Harlan participated in Afghan politics and factional military actions. He was also given the title Prince of Ghor in exchange for military aid. The British-Indians were defeated and forced to withdraw a few years later. Harlan is believed that he has left Afghanistan around the
same period and returned to the United States of America ("Afghanistan and the United States Relations").

After the Treaty of Rawalpindi was signed between Afghanistan and colonial British India, the Afghan mission visited the United States of America to establish diplomatic relations in 1921. After the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1934, the U.S. policy of helping developing nations to raise their standard of living helped to maintain and improve U.S. ties with Afghanistan. Also, Minister Plenipotentiary William Harrison Hornibrook who resided in Tehran became a non-resident U.S. Envoy to Afghanistan from 1935 to 1936.

The United States of America established its first official Kabul Legation in 1942, which was elevated to the Kabul Embassy in 1948. Louis Goethe Dreyfus, who served as Minister Plenipotentiary, became the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from 1949 to 1951. The first official Afghanistan Ambassador to the United States of America was Habibullah Khan Tarzi who served from 1948 to 1953 ("Foreign Relations of Afghanistan").

In the 1950s, the United States of America refused Afghanistan's demand for defense cooperation but extended an economic assistance program focused on the development of Afghanistan's physical infrastructure such as roads, dams, and power plants. Later, American aid shifted from infrastructure projects to technical assistance programs to develop the skills in order to build a modern economy ("Foreign Relations of Afghanistan").

Dwight D. Eisenhower visited Kabul in December 1959 and became the first U.S. President who traveled to Afghanistan. From 1950 to 1979, U.S. foreign assistance provided Afghanistan with more than 500 million dollar in loans, grants, and additional
agricultural products to develop transportation facilities, increase agricultural production, expand the educational system, stimulate industry and improve government administration.

The Peace Corps was active in Afghanistan between 1962 and 1979. During the early 1960s, the last King of Afghanistan Zahir Shah visited the United States and met with John F. Kennedy (“Foreign Relations of Afghanistan”).

After the 1978 Saur Revolution, relations between the two nations became bad. In February 1979, U.S. Ambassador Adolph "Spike" Dubs was killed in Kabul. As a result, the United States of America reduced the assistance and ended the small military training program (“Afghanistan and the United States Relations”).

In nutshell, there is no important relationship between Afghanistan and the USA before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

I.2. The Post-World War II Era and US Containment Policy

The term “Cold War” was first used in a US congress debate on 12 March 1947 on Harry Truman doctrine which supposed aid to free peoples and was intended to respond anywhere in the world to the direct involvement by the USSR in the other nations (Cook and Stevenson 177).

The United States of America emerged from the conflicts of the Second World War as the world’s dominant economic and military power. The relationship between the United States of America and the Soviet Union became worse rapidly. The Cold War was a permanent state of crisis and tension between the United States and the Soviet Union which lasted from the late 1940s to the late 1980s and was a struggle of ideologies. After the Second World War, Soviet Communism and American Capitalism represented
opposite ideological poles and each viewed the progress of the other as a threat to its own interests. The United States of America represented to the Soviet Union an economic and military threat. By possessing the atomic weapon, the United States of America and the Soviet Union had each convinced that the other threatened its own interests and security (McKeever and Davies 227).

I.2.1. US Containment Policy

Containment was a United States policy which means the use of military, economic, and diplomatic strategies to stop the spread of Communism, and improve America’s security and influence abroad. During the Cold War, this policy was a response to a series of moves by the Soviet Union to expand communist influence in Eastern Europe, China, Korea, and Vietnam. It was adopted in the period between détente and rollback policy. The basis of the doctrine was articulated in a 1946 letter by U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan in which he described U.S. foreign policy and the communist’s aggressive attitude toward the West. The word originated in a report Kennan presented to Defense Secretary James Forrestal in 1947 (Lagayette 159).

The origin of Containment began to appear in 1946 when the U.S. State Department asked George F. Kennan, when at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, why the Russians opposed the creation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. He responded with detailed analysis of Russian policy in the form of the Long Telegram. According to Kennan’s long Telegram:

- The Soviets are thinking of perpetual war with capitalism.
- The Soviets would use Marxist allies in the capitalist world.
Clark Clifford and George Elsey produced a report on the Long Telegram and proposed policy recommendations based on its analysis. This report recommended "restraining and confining" Soviet influence and was presented to Truman in September 1946 (“containment”).

In January 1947, Kennan gave a report entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" to Defense Secretary Forrestal who permitted the publication of the report in the journal Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym "X." The use of the word "Containment" originates from this report.

In the X-article, Kennan argued that Soviet power was the product of both ideology and circumstances. Kennan clarified the historical evolution of Soviet ideology. He described the opposition between capitalism and socialism which meant that the United States was facing a long-term strategic challenge. Kennan argued that the American response to this challenge must be a long-term Strategy of Containment which means “the application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographic and political points”. He insisted on the use of military power to prevent the Soviets from expanding their influences (Hutchings 2).

1.2.1.1. Harry Truman Doctrine (1945-53)

In 1947, Containment became identified with the Truman doctrine when he supposed financial assistance to peoples who were threatened by totalitarian regimes. In March 1947, President Truman requested from the Congress to devote about 400 million dollar in order to aid the Greek and Turkish governments to fight Communist destruction. Truman promised to, “Support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures”. This promise became known as the Truman Doctrine.
Describing the issue as a strong struggle between "totalitarian regimes" and "free peoples," the speech represented the starting of the Cold War and the adoption of Containment as official U.S. policy (Mank and Oakland 194).

Truman added to his speech a series of measures to contain Soviet influence in Europe, including the Marshall Plan (1947), or European Recovery Program (ERP), and NATO (1950). In addition, the government relied on the Central Intelligence Agency which established in 1947 to get detailed information about Communist moves because Containment required this ("containment").

I.2.1.2. Dulles

Containment became a doctrine when United States of America acquired the military means to fear its enemies. In 1950, the United States of America became better than the Soviet Union in terms of quantity of weapons. This capacity led Secretary of state John Foster Dulles to develop a new theory of Containment which depended on the notion of the threat of using nuclear weapons and of beginning of series of world scale destruction. In 1952, Dulles demanded the practice of rollback policy and the liberation of Eastern Europe. Dulles was named secretary of state by President Dwight Eisenhower, but Eisenhower's decision not to intervene during the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 led to the division of the Containment doctrine. President Eisenhower relied on secret CIA actions to weaken hostile governments and used economic and military foreign aid to strengthen governments supporting the United States of America in the Cold War (Jones 537-538).

I.2.1.3. Jimmy Carter

President Jimmy Carter ruled from 1976 to 1981 and his foreign policy emphasized human rights. But in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Containment was
again made a priority. The Carter Doctrine (1980) was similar to the Truman Doctrine. In his doctrine, he adopted the “forward foreign policy” and increased the defense expenditure (Brogan 680-681).

I.2.1.4. Ronald Reagan (1981-89)

The Reagan doctrine called for the active support of “freedom fighters” against Communism. After the communist victory in Vietnam, the U.S. president Ronald Reagan, who supported rollback policy, took a more aggressive approach to deal with the USSR, and believed that détente and peaceful coexistence must be stopped. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, American policy makers worried that the Soviets were planning to gain control of the Persian Gulf. Throughout the 1980s, under the policy of the Reagan Doctrine, the United States of America provided technical and economic assistance to the Afghan guerrillas fighting against the Soviet army. By sending military aid to anti-communist resistance movements in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua, Reagan confronted communist governments and went beyond the limits of Containment doctrine. He spread the missiles in Europe and made research on a Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars). Reagan applied the Containment doctrine in several areas. Finally, by the end of the Cold War in 1989, the U.S. Containment policy ended (Lagayette 179).

I.2.2. US Strategy toward Afghanistan before the Soviet Invasion

After the end of World War II, when the US emerged as a superpower, Afghan leaders’ demands for economic and military assistance were refused by Washington. The United States of America saw more strategic significance in relations with Pakistan than with Afghanistan. When the Soviet started to aid Afghanistan in the late 1950s and 1960s,
the United States of America decided to provide some economic assistance too in order to avoid Afghanistan falling into the Soviet camp (Lafraie 114).

By the end of World War II, the Afghan government decided to make a relationship with the United States of America to serve as a balance to the Soviet Union. However, Afghanistan’s weakness and policy of neutrality made it an unexpected candidate for close ties with the United States of America. At that time, US policy was focused on preventing Soviet expansion and on establishing treaty relationships with a number of states that could contain the Soviet Union such as Iran. With the emergence of Iran and Pakistan as allies to the United States of America, a weak Afghanistan which was neutral did not seem essential to the US Strategy. Indeed, it seemed impossible to maintain close relationships, particularly military relationships, with both Afghanistan and Pakistan due to the continuous tensions between the two countries resulting from the colonial era Durand Line (Burrough 5).

After Pakistan’s independence in 1947, the Durand Line, which had divided the Afghan nation, was considered as the boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghan government officials, led by the King’s cousin and Prime Minister, Prince Daoud, started to establish a “Pashtunistan”, including all lands in which the Pashtun people inhabited. As a majority of Pashtuns lived in Pakistan, the Pakistani government viewed to unify the Pashtuns, and as a result the two countries had encountered politically and militarily. The United States of America could not support Afghanistan on this issue because Pakistan was an important partner in the Containment Strategy. A search for support on Pashtunistan led the Afghans to make relationships with the Soviet Union, especially for military sales and training (5-6).
Afghanistan had played only a minor role in the early US Cold War Strategy but that would change with the Soviet invasion. The Cold War policy established during the Truman administration neglected Afghanistan for many reasons. The American interests in Afghanistan as part of the Containment policy against Soviet expansion were marginalized due to the relationships established with Iran and Pakistan and the lack of any other vital interest in Afghanistan. Tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the Pashtun issue also led to minimal involvement of the United States of America in the Afghan government. The Soviet Union supported Afghanistan on the Pashtun issue, while the U.S. government supported the Pakistani government. Also, the United States of America refused the Afghanistan’s requests for US military assistance because it was afraid of potential military actions against Pakistan. However, the US government provided limited economic assistance to Afghanistan (8-9).

The US government attempted to increase the aids to Afghanistan to move at the same speed as the Soviet, but by 1978, the Soviets had provided to it doubled economic and military aid which reached 1 billion dollar compared to the US government. The Soviet Union had a long-term Strategy for Afghanistan. He was working towards more influence in South Asia and the Middle East and intended to gain access to a warm water port in the Indian Ocean or the Persian Gulf. Much of the Soviet aid was used in northern Afghanistan to build roads and military air bases in order to use them in future military operations. The US government was relaying on strong relationships with Iran and Pakistan, and only limited strategic involvement in Afghanistan to limit Soviet expansion in the region. The majority of the limited aid provided by the U.S. was for economic and agricultural projects in south and southwest Afghanistan such as the Helmand Valley Project. However, U.S. position in the region changed in 1979 with the Iranian Islamic revolution, the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Cold
War balance of power in the region had shifted towards the Soviet Union and US national security was at risk (9).

II. The Period of the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989)

II.1. Political History of Afghanistan from the Late 20th Century to the Soviet Occupation in December 1979

King Mohammed Zahir Shah reigned from 1933 to 1973. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was formed in 1965. It was a pro-Soviet and communist party. The goals of the PDPA were to overthrow the economic and political dominance of the feudal class through a national democratic revolution. The Marxist PDPA party's strength grew in these years. In 1967, the PDPA divided into two rival factions, the Khalq (Masses) faction headed by Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin and the Parcham (Flag) faction led by Babrak Karmal. In general Parcham was more reformists and wanted to work with the progressive wing of the ruling class, while Khalq were more rebellious (Mather 100).

Afghanistan began to witness instability in the 1970s when the opposed Communist Party and Islamic movements grew strongly. While receiving medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud, a military leader who established a dictatorship with strong involvement in the economy (Katzman 1-2).

Previous Prime Minister Daoud seized power in a military coup on July 17, 1973, after a severe drought and the King's government accusation of corruption and poor economic conditions. Daoud put an end to the monarchy and declared a Republic of
Afghanistan but his time in power was unpopular because Daud began to collaborate more closely with the Shah of Iran and the corruption increased. In 1978, the factions of the PDPA had opposed him because of the repression imposed on them by Daoud's regime and the death of a leading PDPA member, Mir Akbar Khyber. Leaders of the PDPA feared that Daoud was planning to destroy them because many of them were arrested. These circumstances led to large anti-Daoud demonstrations in Kabul, which resulted in the arrest of several PDPA leaders. On April 27, 1978, Hafizullah Amin with other PDPA members organized an uprising which became known as the Saur revolution. Nur Mohammad Taraki, Babrak Karmal and Hafizullah Amin overthrew the regime of Mohammad Daoud, who was executed during the April 1978 Saur Revolution (Young 117).

After the revolution, the government was divided along factional lines, with President Taraki and Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin of the Khalq faction against Parcham leaders such as Babrak Karmal and Mohammad Najibullah. Within the PDPA, conflicts resulted in exiles, and executions of Parcham members (Calvocoressi 494).

Secretary General of the PDPA Nur Muhammad Taraki became President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. During his ruling, the PDPA applied a Soviet program of modernizing reforms and carried out a socialist agenda which included changes in marriage customs and oppressive land reform which were refused by all Afghans. They also imprisoned and killed thousands of members of the traditional elite and the religious establishment. They also declared equality of the sexes by introducing more women to political life. Islamic parties opposed and rebelled against the attempt of rapid modernization. As a result, by mid 1978, the rebels attacked the local military garrison in the Nuristan region of eastern Afghanistan (494).
In December 1978, Moscow signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Afghanistan, and the Soviet military assistance program increased gradually. The Soviet Union assisted the Afghanistan’s regime by giving it military equipment and advisers as the rebellion spread and the Afghan army began to collapse. By October 1979, relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union were tense as Hafizullah Amin refused to take Soviet advice on how to stabilize and make his government more secure and stronger (young 118).

By the spring of 1979, rebellion and resistance had spread throughout the country. The resistance was spontaneous but soon had been led by an alliance of conservative Islamic groups who had been known as Mujahideen (holy warriors). On March 24, a garrison of soldiers in Herat killed a group of Soviet advisers and their families who had ordered Afghan troops to fire on antigovernment demonstrators. The government response to these actions was the repression, the common arrests and the execution without trial. Police terror was common in the city as well as the countryside (Gasper 3).

As the situation got out of control, the Soviets advised Taraki to dismiss Amin, reunite with Parcham, and adopt a policy of “democratic nationalism.” But Amin discovered the plan and arrested Taraki in September 1979, and later killed him later (Calvocoressi 494).

The Soviet Union gradually increased the Soviet forces along the Afghan-Soviet border, introduced Soviet small-force units into Afghanistan itself and made a direct pressure on Amin either to resign or to allow the Soviets to put down the rebellion. At the end of December, as Kabul government began to weaken from internal struggle and external rebel pressure, 100,000 Soviet troops had entered Afghanistan. Moscow decided that Amin had to be removed from power. On December 27, a force of 5,000 Soviet troops
advanced on Kabul, but Amin refused to leave office. On December 28, Amin was killed with 2,000 loyal members of his armed forces by the soviet forces at the presidential palace. The Russians replaced Amin with a former head of the Parcham communist faction Babrak Karmal who took control of Afghanistan with Soviet help and support. Within a few days, the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan had reached 80,000. Therefore; the Russian occupation of Afghanistan had begun. Soviet leaders claimed that the Afghan government had made requests for Soviet military assistance. Moscow considered Afghanistan as an international duty (Young 118).

The Soviet Union sent troops to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 to prevent the Islamic militias, known as the Mujahideen, to take power. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan to help the communist government (Katzman1-2).

II.2. American Reaction on the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan

U.S. intelligence sources had been aware of the large increase of Soviet forces on the Afghan border before the invasion, but the Carter administration failed to publicly discourage an attack. However, after the attack there was a dramatic change in U.S. foreign policy toward Afghanistan with the establishment of the Carter Doctrine that called for resisting Soviet expansion beyond Afghanistan. The new policy declared the right of the U.S. to use military force to defend its vital and strategic interests in the Persian Gulf region. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, American policy makers worried that the Soviets were planning to control the Persian Gulf (McCauley77).

US President Jimmy Carter claimed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the most serious threat to peace since the Second World War. Washington interpreted this aggression in Afghanistan as a planned Russian Strategy rather than a response to the
dangerous struggle of the weak Afghanistan’s regime. United States President Jimmy Carter insisted that what he termed "Soviet aggression" could not be viewed as an isolated event of limited geographical importance but had to be contested as a potential threat to US influence in the Persian Gulf region. The USA was also worried about the USSR gaining access to the Indian Ocean by coming to an arrangement with Pakistan. The invasion was considered as a blow to American prestige. The American position in and around the Gulf was weakened by this event and by the fall of the Shah of Iran of Iran. In order to restore its position in the Gulf, Carter switched the international attention to Afghanistan. He was supported by Muslim world. Foreign ministers from 34 Islamic nations adopted a decision which condemned the Soviet intervention and demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Muslim nation of Afghanistan. The United Nation General Assembly passed a resolution protesting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by a vote of 104-18. The UN had condemned the invasion since January 1980 but a Security Council demand for the withdrawal of Russian forces had been vetoed by Russia (Brogan 681).

The Carter administration took a number of actions in response to the Soviet invasion, including economic sanctions in which America banned the export of grain and weapons to Russia, the withdrawal of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), and the American refuse to participate in the 1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow. In order to establish and expand military capability in the region, the Carter administration created a new military command (known as Central Command) and began efforts to develop new security relations with countries in the region. At this same time, the Carter administration also tried to improve relationships with China to balance power in the region. The defense budget was raised and the independence of the Persian Gulf region was declared to be a vital interest of the United States of America (Burrough 10).
These American actions were just symbolic because the Carter administration knew that Russia had got its own Vietnam and it also provided American Intelligence with an opportunity to acquire any new Russian military weapons that could be used in Afghanistan (Zinn 572).

II.3. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989

II.3.1. The Course of the War: December 1979 to January 1987

The Soviet War in Afghanistan was a ten-year conflict between the Soviet Union which supported the Marxist government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and the Islamist Mujahideen Resistance. The Mujahideen had been supported by several countries such as the United States of America, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt and other Muslim nations through the context of the Cold War. The conflict in Afghanistan has often been called the Soviets' Vietnam (“Soviet war in Afghanistan”).

The Soviet Union sent Eighty thousand troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent the Islamic militias to take power. During their invasion, the Soviets replaced Hafizullah Amin with an ally, Babrak Karmal from the Parcham faction of the communist PDPA. Karmal attempted to regain control of the central government and to change many of the unpopular social and economic reforms applied by the previous communist leaders. However, his government had been supported by the Soviet Union. The Soviet army remained in the country to fight the Mujahideen guerrillas. Repressive and brutal Soviet military operations also undermined Karmal’s efforts to establish control of the country. As a result, his government was just a puppet regime (Cook and Stevenson 179).
In the first phase of the war, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan along two ground routes and one air corridor, quickly taking control of the major urban centers, military bases and strategic installations. However, the presence of Soviet troops did not achieve the goal of pacifying the country. On the contrary, it led the rebellion to spread further. Babrak Karmal accused the Soviets that they increased the unrest. Thus, the Soviet troops found themselves fought against urban uprisings, tribal armies, and sometimes against Afghan Army units (Robert 688).

During the 10-year occupation of Afghanistan, about five million Afghanis fled the country to refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran and approximately 1.5 million were killed. Soviet military operations destroyed crops, irrigation systems, and property. As a result, groups of Islamic tribes formed an alliance that became known as the Mujahideen. They were anti-Soviet and anti-Communist. They declared a jihad (Holy war) and organized the Afghan mujahedeen to force the Soviets to leave Afghanistan and overthrow the communist Afghan government (Barracks 18).

The Mujahideen were equipped with old rifles but had knowledge of the mountains around Kabul and the weather conditions that would be encountered there. By 1982, the Mujahideen could control 75% of Afghanistan (“Soviet invasion of Afghanistan”).

Between 1980 and 1985, the war entered a new phase. The Soviets occupied the cities, while the Mujahideen began a guerrilla war. Soviet troops were deployed in strategic areas in the Northeast. In the west, special Soviet units have also performed secret attacks on Iranian territory to destroy mujahideen bases. Between 1980 and 1985, nine offensives were begun by the Soviet army in the important area of Panjshir Valley. Violent fighting also occurred in the provinces neighboring Pakistan, where cities and government posts were surrounded by the Mujahideen. In the West and South, fighting occurred
sometimes, except in the cities of Herat and Kandahar that were controlled by the resistance. However, these Soviet tactics were useless against the mountain-based guerrilla fighters. As a result, the Soviets changed the tactics to the use of aerial bombing (“Soviet War in Afghanistan”).

In March 1985, the new Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev expressed his impatience with the Afghan conflict. As a result, the size of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces (LCOSF) was increased to 108,800 and fighting increased throughout the country, making 1985 the bloodiest year of the war. However, the Mujahideen continued resisting the Soviets.

The puppet government of President Karmal was ineffective. It was weakened by divisions within the PDPA and the Parcham faction, and was unable to give its support to the soviets. In 1986, after Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the director of Afghan intelligence, Najibullah Ahmedzai. Najibullah was from the Parcham faction of the PDPA and previous chief of the Afghan secret police (KHAD). Also, a new constitution was adopted in July which allowed the formation of other political parties beside the communists. The name of the country was changed to the Republic of Afghanistan. He also introduced in 1987 a policy of "national reconciliation", created by experts of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Katzman 2).

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was like the Vietnam War in its brutality. As a result, Afghanistan became a base for terrorists. Afghanistan seemed to perfectly summarize the Cold War. From the west's point of view, Afghanistan had shown the way Communism wanted to proceed (“Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan”).
II.3.2. The Rise of Mujahideen and the Resistance during 1980s

During the occupation, the Mujahideen were the most important group that strongly opposed the Soviets. In the mid-1980s, the Afghan resistance movement had been assisted by the United States of America, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, the People's Republic of China and others in their struggle against the Soviets and the puppet government that the Soviets had imposed on the country. The United States of America saw the conflict in Afghanistan as an integral Cold War struggle, and the CIA provided assistance to anti-Soviet forces through the Pakistani intelligence services, in a program called Operation Cyclone (“Soviet War in Afghanistan”).

The mujahideen were a mix of Afghan resistance fighters, Afghan refugees who had crossed into Pakistan at the beginning of the Soviet invasion. Many Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabian, participated in fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan by bringing groups of Afghan Arabs, who were foreign fighters and wished to began jihad against the atheist communists (Gasper 6).

As well as training and recruiting Afghan nationals to fight the Soviets, the CIA permitted its ISI allies to recruit Muslim extremists from around the world. Between 1982 and 1992, some 35,000 Muslim radicals from 43 Islamic countries in the Middle East, North and East Africa, Central Asia and the Far East joined with the Afghan mujahideen. Tens of thousands foreign Muslim radicals came to study in the hundreds of new madrassas (religious schools) that Zia’s military government began to fund in Pakistan and along the Afghan border. As a result, they were influenced by the jihad against the USSR (6).
In camps near Peshawar and in Afghanistan, one of the first non-Afghan volunteers to join the Mujahideen was Osama Bin Laden who is a civil engineer and businessman from a wealthy family in Saudi Arabia. After leaving college in 1979, Bin Laden joined Abdullah Azzam to fight against the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and lived for a time in Peshawar. By 1984, Bin Laden with Azzam established Maktab al-Khadamat which sent money, arms and Muslim fighters from around the Arabic world to the Afghan war. Osama established a camp in Afghanistan and with other volunteers fought the Soviets (Gasper 6).

Bin Laden recruited 4,000 volunteers from his own country and developed close relations with the most radical Mujahideen leaders. He also worked closely with the CIA, raising money from private Saudi citizens. According to Gasper in his "International Socialist Review":

The CIA shipped high-powered sniper rifles directly to bin Laden's operation in 1989. "In 1988, with U.S. knowledge, Bin Laden created Al Qaeda (The Base). By 1988, Bin Laden had split from Maktab al-Khidamat. While Azzam acted as support for Afghan fighters, Bin Laden wanted a more military role. One of the main points leading to the split and the creation of al-Qaeda was Azzam's insistence that Arab fighters be integrated among the Afghan fighting groups instead of forming a separate fighting force. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Bin Laden and thousands of other volunteers returned to their own countries. (6)

The Mujahideen preferred sabotage operations among them damaging power lines, attacking pipelines and radio stations, blowing up government office buildings, air terminals, hotels, cinemas, and so on. From 1985 to 1987, over 600 terrorist acts occurred. In the border region with Pakistan, the Mujahideen launched 800 missiles per day.
Between April 1985 and January 1987, they carried out over 23,500 attacks on government targets.

They concentrated on both civilian and military targets, knocking out bridges, closing major roads, disrupting the electric power system and industrial production, and attacking police stations and Soviet military equipments and air bases. They killed government officials and PDPA members, and surrounded rural outposts. In March 1982, a bomb exploded at the Ministry of Education and led to the destruction of several buildings. In the same month, the transmission line from the Naghlu power station was blown up. In June 1982, about 1000 communist party members sent out to work in the Panjshir valley have killed. On September 4, 1985, rebels shot down a domestic Bakhtar Airlines plane as it took off from Kandahar airport, killing 52 people. In May 1985, the seven principal rebel organizations formed the Seven Party Mujahideen Alliance to coordinate their military operations against the Soviet army (Katzman 1).

By mid-1987 the Soviet Union announced it must start withdrawing its forces. The mujahedin were also well organized and coordinated by seven major parties that in early 1989 formed Afghan Interim Government (AIG). The seven party leaders were Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi; Sibghatullah Mojaddedi; Gulbuddin Hikmatyar; Burhanuddin Rabbani; Yunus Khalis; Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf; and Pir Gaylani. Sibghatullah Mojaddedi was selected as the head of the Interim Islamic State of Afghanistan. Mojaddedi met with Vice President of the United States George H. W. Bush to achieve a critical diplomatic victory for the Afghan resistance. Defeat of the Kabul government was their solution for peace. This decision led to their refusal to accept a political compromise (Katzman 1).
II.3.3. The War in Afghanistan: the Saudi-American partnership

Wahabism as religious view used as religious Strategy during the Containment period. With the American connivance, Saudi money helped to create a Sunni Cordon Sanitaire around Iran to contain the spread of revolutionary Shiism in many countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thus, the Islamic state of Taliban in Afghanistan was hostile to Islamic Republic of Iran (Almond et al 601).

The Saudi-U.S. partnership aimed at rolling back Communism in Afghanistan (1979-1989). National security advisor Brzezinski and deputy secretary of state Warren Christopher had met with Fahd and the Saudi foreign minister Saud al-Faisal in Riyadh in February 1979. They had agreed on a matching program in which Saudi Arabia would give financial aid to the USA in order to confront the Soviet Communism in Afghanistan (viden 12-14).

Both Saudi Arabia and United States of America had their own reasons from the Afghan partnership. Whereas Zbigniew Brezinski considered as response to the Soviets for their actions in Africa and Southeast Asia, the Saudis refused the invasion of a Muslim country. Also, to Turki al-Faisal (Saudi Arabia’s intelligence chief at the time and former ambassador to the U.S.) the Soviet Invasion represented a threat to the Saudi Kingdom because the Soviets had reached Africa. Furthermore, the Reagan administration saw the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan as an opportunity to directly confront the Soviet Union (Bronson 153).

Saudi Arabia took the opportunity of the Afghan issue to re-assert its leadership in the Islamic world after the Iranian revolution of 1979 and to encourage Islamists volunteers to fight against the Soviet Union rather than the United States America. The
Containment of Iranian influence was also a major US objective. Saudi money especially went to small groups in Afghanistan that shared their anti-Shia Wahhabi doctrines. Saudi money went to Hekmatyar's group because of its religious disagreement towards the non-Sunni groups. The Saudis also funded refugee schools and madrasas in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was from these that the Taliban emerged. Concerning Iran, it did not support the Afghan Mujahideen. It provided support to the Shia groups, and formed its own organizations (Alexiev 4).

II.3.4. The American Aid to the Mujahideen

As part of a Cold War Strategy, President Jimmy Carter and the US government immediately declared that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan threatened vital US interests in the Persian Gulf area. As a result, the carter administration used the event as an excuse for increasing a program of military expenditure that had already been begun. Also, the USA had begun training, arming and funding Mujahideen to fight against the Soviets. According to the US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, CIA aid to rebels within Afghanistan was approved in July 1979, six months before the Soviet Invasion. Former CIA director Robert Gates later admitted in his memoirs that aid to the rebels began in June 1979. On July 3, 1979, US President Jimmy Carter signed an executive order authorizing the CIA to organize secret propaganda operations from Pakistan against the communist regime. Additionally, The USA had begun to fund and train anti-government Mujahideen forces through the Pakistani secret service agency known as Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) for at least the previous six months. In a 1998 interview with Le Nouvel Observateur, Zbigniew Brezinski, Carter’s national security adviser, confirmed that U.S. aid to the rebels began before the invasion:
According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahideen began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise: indeed, it was July 3, 1979, that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet U.S.-backed Mujahideen fighters' regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention…. We didn’t push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would….

That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap…. The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War. (qtd. in Gasper 3-4).

The Russian invasion in December led to the increase of the US support to the Afghan rebels. According to Gasper in his "International Socialist Review":

Three weeks after Soviet tanks rolled into Kabul, Carter’s secretary of defence, Harold Brown, was in Beijing arranging for a weapons transfer from the Chinese to the CIA-backed Afghani troops mustered in Pakistan. The Chinese, who were generously compensated for the deal, agreed and even consented to send military advisers. Brown worked out a similar arrangement with Egypt to buy 15 million dollar worth of weapons. “The U.S. contacted me,” [then-Egyptian president] Anwar Sadat recalled shortly before his assassination [in 1981]. “They told me, ‘Please open your stores for us so that we can give the Afghans the armaments they need to fight.’ And I gave them the armaments. The transport of arms to the Afghans started from Cairo on U.S. planes”. (4)
By February 1980, the Washington Post reported that the mujahideen were receiving arms from the US government. The objective of the intervention was to trap the Soviets in a long and costly war just like what happened to the United States of America in Vietnam. To hurt the Russians, the USA chose to give the most support to the most extreme groups. The largest portion of US arms went to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a fanatical fundamentalist. Brezinski hoped to drive the Russians out of Afghanistan. Moreover, his plan was to export the ideologies of nationalism and Islam to the Muslim-majority Central Asian states and Soviet Republics in order to destroy the Soviet order (5).

After the Soviet deployment, Pakistan’s military ruler General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq accepted financial aid from the Western powers to aid the Mujahideen. With the support of Pakistan’s military dictator, General Zia-ul-Haq, the USA began recruiting and training both Mujahideen fighters from the 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and large numbers of mercenaries from other Islamic countries. The US government had given to the Afghan rebels approximately between 3 to 6 billion dollar, or more (5).

When Ronald Reagan came to office in 1981, he maintained the Carter emphasis on the Persian Gulf-Arabian Peninsula sector that followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. After the Afghanistan invasion, Reagan claimed that the main threat to peace and stability in the region was the Soviet Union and its policies. Therefore, it was important to restore American capability and credibility by increasing American forces to deal with the region. He assumed that the main focus of American interests and concern in the Middle East was the Persian Gulf sector, including Afghanistan which could pose a direct threat to the security of the Gulf. Reagan's policy toward Afghanistan maintained that while the United States of America would not use its military forces in Afghanistan, so it would provide aid to the Afghan rebels to make pressure on the Soviet Union to
withdraw its forces. Therefore, aid for the mujahideen through Zia's Pakistan increased due to the efforts of Texas Congressman Charlie Wilson and CIA officer Gust Avrakotos in 1981. Throughout the 1980s, under a policy that had been known as the Reagan Doctrine, the United States of America provided technical and economic assistance to the Afghan guerrillas to fight against the Soviet army through the CIA in cooperation with Pakistan’s ISI directorate in what US military and intelligence forces called "Operation Cyclone. On March 1982, Reagan proclaimed March 21st to be an Afghanistan Day throughout the United States of America (Gasper 5).

Recent reports state that the United States of America and Saudi Arabia provided about 40 billion dollar in cash and weapons, which included more than two thousand FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missiles, for increasing Islamic groups against the Soviet Union. Saudi Arabia was also providing financial support (“Afghanistan”).

In March 1985, the US government adopted National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 166 which was a secret plan to raise secret action in Afghanistan and aimed at achieving military victory for the Mujahideen. The Mujahideen had been provided by the USA with high technology and military expertise in order to attack Soviet commanders and soldiers. According to Gasper in his "International Socialist Review":

The CIA supplied Mujahideen rebels with extensive satellite reconnaissance data of Soviet targets on the Afghan area, plans for military operations based on the satellite intelligence, intercepts of Soviet communications, secret communications networks for the rebels, bombs for urban destruction and guerrilla attacks, long-range sniper rifles, a targeting device for mortars that was linked to a U.S. Navy satellite, wire-guided anti-tank missiles, and other equipment. (5)
After 1985 the CIA and ISI forced the Mujahideen to attack government castles. The CIA started programs for training Afghans in techniques such as car bombs, assassinations and strategic ways to attack the Soviet borders. Between 1986 and 1989, the Mujahideen were also provided with more than 1,000 state-of-the-art, shoulder-fired Stinger antiaircraft missiles. Also, The People's Republic of China also sold tanks and assault rifles to the Mujahideen in co-operation with the CIA. By 1987, CIA operations officers helped Pakistani trainers establish schools for the mujahideen in secure communications, guerrilla warfare, urban sabotage and heavy weapons. Although the CIA claimed that the purpose was to attack military targets, Mujahideen trained in using these techniques, and using bombs supplied by the USA, carried out numerous car bombings and assassination attacks in Kabul itself (6).

US secret military aid for the Mujahedeen, with support from Saudi Arabia, was important in the defeat and withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. However, in order to execute the aid operations secretly, the United States of America was forced to work through the Pakistani government as an intermediary for the distribution of the military aid. Secret US aid began under the Carter administration after the invasion. To counter the Soviet air superiority, the US government started providing the Mujahedeen with man-portable Stinger surface-to-air missiles. By 1986, it was clear to the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that forces must be withdrawn from Afghanistan (Burrough 11).

In many ways, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the United State’s support of the Mujahideen resistance was another round of the Afghan “Great Game.” The “Great Game” portrays Central Asia, and specifically Afghanistan, as the region where international superpower struggles occurred.

During the Soviet occupation, the United Nations had criticized the U.S.S.R.’s interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and was important in obtaining a negotiated Soviet withdrawal under the Geneva Accords. United Nations played a vital role in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Being an international organization, it saved the interest of Afghanistan as the Soviet invasion was destroying the country’s condition (Agrawal).

From 1982, the UN issued annual request for a ceasefire, for a timetable for the withdrawal of Russian forces, and for agreements between the Pakistani and Afghan government to stop aid to the mujahideen through Pakistan and to return the thousands of Afghan refugees who had fled to Pakistan. Peace efforts by UN representatives Perez de Guellar and Diego Cordovez brought Afghanistan and Pakistan in June 1982 into “proximity talks” but the situation did not change until the coming of Gorbachev (Calvocoressi 497).

By 1986, Faced with international pressure and great number of casualties on both sides, it was clear to the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that forces must be withdrawn from Afghanistan. Gorbachev started by replacing Karmal with former security service chief Mohammed Najibullah in May 1986 and beginning negotiations with the USA that led to the signing of the Geneva Accords on April 1988. The Accords agreed to the full withdrawal of Soviet forces by February 1989 and the end of military assistance to both the Afghan government and the Mujahedeen (Burrough 11).
In 1988, the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the United States of America and Soviet Union serving as guarantors, signed an agreement which included the major differences between them known as the Geneva Accords. The United Nations started a special Mission to oversee the process. Also the Geneva accords identified the American and Soviet non-intervention in the internal affairs of Pakistan and Afghanistan and a timetable for full Soviet withdrawal. On February 15, 1989, the last Soviet troops departed on schedule from Afghanistan. The United States of America closed its embassy in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its withdrawal (Katzman 2).

The Geneva Accords of 1988 led to the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in early 1989 but left the Afghan government in ruins. The accords had failed to discuss the issue of the post-occupation period and the future governance of Afghanistan (Barracks 19).

After the Soviet withdrawal, the United Nations has assisted the refugees to return to Afghanistan and has provided humanitarian aid such as health care, educational programs, and food and has supported mine-clearing operations. The UNDP and associated agencies have started a limited number of development projects (Agrawal).

The American goal of getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan had been achieved and the Soviet withdrawal was seen as an ideological victory to the USA which had supported the Mujahideen in order to confront the Soviet influence in the region of Persian Gulf. After the removal of the Soviet forces in 1989, the USA lost interest in Afghanistan and did not help to rebuild the country after the war destruction. The USSR continued to support the regime of Najibullah until its downfall in 1992. On the other hand, the U.S.A has continued to provide military support for the Mujahideen against the communist Najibullah regime, but the focus of US strategic interests was still the Soviet Union and not Afghanistan itself (Burrough 12).
The Reagan administration created for the ‘evil empire’ its own “Vietnam”. Withdrawal of the Red Army from Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War led to the beginning of a ‘new world order’ in which Afghanistan had played little role (LaFraie 114).

III. Post-Soviet Occupation 1989-1992

In February 1989, the final Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan. During this time, the Civil War continued as the Mujahideen were against the government of President Najibullah and the Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan was proposed and established by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, but the proposal did not take into consideration all the Afghan ethnic groups. Struggle between the Mujahideen factions began immediately. The result was that the Afghan government of Najibullah in Kabul which has been supported by the Soviet remained another three years. The Russians continued to support the Najibullah regime, and the USA continued to support the Mujahideen. There was more fighting between the Mujahedeen factions than against the communist regime (Burrough 12).

The Afghan fighting continued throughout 1990. As a result, both the United States and Soviet governments began cooperative efforts in December 1990 to end the conflict. Benan Sevan as special representative of the UN secretary general attempted to apply a political formula that had been announced by UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar on 21 May 1991. It included: recognition of Afghanistan's sovereign status as a politically non-aligned Islamic state; acceptance of the right of Afghans to self-determination in choosing their form of government and social and economic systems; need for a transitional period permitting a dialogue between Afghans leading to establishment of a government with widely based support; the termination of all foreign arms deliveries into Afghanistan; funding from the international community adequate to
support the return of Afghanistan's refugees and its reconstruction from the destruction of war ("Democratic Republic of Afghanistan").

The first agreements of UN which proposed transitional government of Afghanistan were rejected by the Soviet side. On September 13, 1991, Moscow and Washington agreed to stop the military aid to the Afghan combatants. Finally, a settlement was reached in December 1991. However, this decision failed to force the Mujahideen to give up all weapons. On March 18, 1992, Najibullah agreed to resign when an interim government was formed. That announcement led to rebellions primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern Afghanistan, who joined Mujahideen commander Ahmad Shah Masud of the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. In April 1992, Najibullah resigned as mujahideen forces attempted to take control of the capital. Hekmatyar’s Pashtun forces joined with the rebellious Afghan government forces to take control of Kabul, but were removed by Ahmed Shah Masoud’s non Pashtun forces. An interim government was established but it immediately was attacked by the radical Islamic mujahideen forces led by Hekmatyar and fighting continued for the next four years of Civil War. The Mujahideen regime began April 18, 1992 (Katzman 2).

The US policy objectives towards Afghanistan during this period had been to end communist rule and Soviet influence in the region. Little or no concern was given for a Strategy that would preserve US influence under a post-communist government. The USA continued to intervene in Afghanistan affairs after the Soviet withdrawal because of the continued influence of the Soviets in the communist Afghan government. With the fall of the Najibullah regime in April 1992, the US government declared success and tried to stop the interference in Afghanistan (Burrough 13).
Conclusion

In nutshell, we can say that at the beginning of the Cold War era, the United States of America provided economic support to Afghanistan and avoided to engage in a direct and declared race with the Soviet Union to gain the support of the Afghan government in the cold war. Moreover, U.S. investments and involvement have prevented the Afghan government fall early under the Soviet occupation. However, this period characterized by the lack of the American interest in Afghanistan because the United States of America has had priorities in other areas. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the only interest of the USA that wanted to reach was to exclude the soviets from the region. Again, when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, the USA lost interest in Afghanistan and it did not want to make further direct involvement when it had achieved its Containment goals in Afghanistan.
Introduction

The United States has always looked at Afghanistan through the prism of its national security interests. Withdrawal of the Red Army from Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War had been a sign for Washington to begin a new world order in which Afghanistan had played little role. With the loss of US interest in Afghanistan, and with a weak government in Kabul, Pakistan led a Civil War to break out in the country which led to the Taliban domination in the second half of the 1990s.

I. Afghan Civil War (1992-96)

The Interim Government established after the end of the communist Afghan government in April 1992 had trouble from the start. The Peshawar Accords created the Islamic State of Afghanistan and appointed an Interim Government for a transitional period. The anti-government radical Islamic forces under Hekmatyar attacked and destroyed much of the infrastructure of Kabul. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar’s radical faction of the Islamist Hizb-el-Islami accused Rabbani of monopolizing power. When Tajik cleric Burhanuddin Rabbani was elected president in December 1992, the Civil War broke out. The Civil War occurred from 1992 until 1996 while the Interim Government gradually destroyed. Anti- and pro-government factions fought for control of the central authority. The Afghanistan central government collapsed, and the country was governed by local warlords (Burrough 13-14).
During this period of disorder, the Taliban emerged in 1994 as a political-religious movement in South Central Afghanistan. It followed Sunni sect. It had been supported by the refugee camps and religious schools (madrassas) in Pakistan. The Taliban combined conservative Islamic Saudi Wahhabism in the madrassas to form a strict interpretation of Islam. The Pakistani madrassas were supported by Saudi aid and had established political links with the Pakistani government security service (ISI) (14).

I.1. US policy during the Afghan Civil War

During this Afghan Civil War period, the U.S. followed a “hands-off” approach which means “not our problem” to deal with Afghanistan and left most of political peacemaking efforts to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. They urged the cooperation of all factions with the UN Secretary General’s Special representative. However, those nations’ attempts at peace-brokering were not Successful because both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia supported the radical Islamic approach to governance offered by the Taliban (Burrough 74-75).

II. Taliban Rule (1996-2001)

The Taliban regime was led by Mullah Muhammad Omar. He remained in the Taliban power base in Qandahar. Omar established a political and personal relation with Osama Bin Laden and refused the demands of the United States of America to extradite him. Most of the important figures in the Taliban regime were Ghilzai Pashtuns from Eastern Afghanistan (Katzman 5).

The Taliban under the leadership of Mullah Omar (a Ghilzai Pashtun) conducted military attacks against various warlords starting in 1994 and captured control of
Kandahar. The Taliban seized Kabul on September 27, 1996, and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. After the fall of Kabul, Massoud and Abdul Rashid Dostum created the United Front (Northern Alliance) against the Taliban that were preparing offensives against the remaining areas under the control of Massoud and those under the control of Dostum. The Taliban defeated Dostum's forces militarily by seizing Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998. Dostum went into exile (“Afganistan”).

Rabbani remained the legitimate president of Afghanistan in exile in Iran, and the anti-Taliban Mujahideen fled Kabul for the Northern regions of the country. The anti-Taliban Mujahideen, the Northern Alliance, would continue to fight under the leadership of Massoud and the Uzbek General Dostum (Burrough 14-15).

Before the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban regime controlled 75 percent of the country and was recognized as the legitimate government by only Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates. Both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan played roles in the rise of the Taliban and continued their support throughout most of the 1990s. During the late 1990s, Saudi Arabia withdrew the financial support, but continued to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The Taliban tried to achieve a recognition from the USA, but were unsuccessful due to their mistreatment of women and other human rights violations. The United Nations continued to recognize the Rabbani regime in exile as the legitimate government of Afghanistan in the absence of broad international recognition of the Taliban regime (Burrough18).

The success of the Taliban regime was because of several factors among them the promise of stability, security, and an end to warlordism, and a return to a decentralized government similar to the traditional Pashtun village government system. The Taliban took advantage of the situation caused by the internal conflict between the various Mujahideen
factions, blaming them for the destruction and suffering of the Afghan people (Dorronsoro 5).

The Taliban movement gained the popular support of the Afghan majority. It enforced strict religious rules and punishment, including public executions. Dress codes were enforced and many freedoms were taken away. The Taliban was hard on the Hazaras due to the ethnic and religious differences of the Shi’a sect. The unfair treatment of the Hazaras caused tension between the Taliban and Iran and led to the conflict on the Iran border. To counter this injustice, Iran provided support for the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance (Kemp 42-43).

The Taliban began to lose international and domestic support as it imposed strict principles of Islamic customs and punishments such as executions. They used physical punishments to enforce strict Islamic practices such as bans on television, Western music, and dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home (Katzman 6).

II.1. U.S. Efforts against Al Qaeda during Taliban Rule

The Clinton Administration held talks with the Taliban government before and after it took power, but was unable to change its policies. The United States of America refused to recognize Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The United Nations continued to meet representatives of the Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The State Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, DC, to be closed in August 1997. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1193 (August 28, 1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged the Taliban to end discrimination against women. Women’s rights groups urged the Clinton Administration not to recognize the Taliban government. In May 1999, the Senate-
passed S.Res.68 asked the President not to recognize an Afghan government that oppresses women (Katzman 6).


The response of the USA to the Taliban in the mid to late 1990s was unclear because it had lost any agreed strategic framework with which to deal with the new power. On one hand, the Clinton administration recognized the stability the Taliban provided. Two key U.S. allies in the area, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, supported the Taliban, and there was pressure from the US business community to engage the Taliban in establishing an oil and gas pipeline through Taliban-controlled portion of Afghanistan from Turkmenistan to an Indian Ocean port. The fact that the Taliban were anti-Iranian and anti-Russian also had some influence on U.S. assessment of the Taliban (Burrough 16).

On the other hand, Taliban attitudes toward women and absolute disregard for human rights produced tensions between the USA and Afghanistan. The result was an American absence of any activist policy and a withdrawal from shaping operations in Afghanistan (16).
US Strategy towards Afghanistan and the Taliban was only based on their involvement with Osama Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorist organization. In 1996, after being expelled from Sudan at the encouragement of the USA and Saudi Arabia government, Bin Laden moved to Afghanistan where he had fought with the mujahedeen during the Afghan-Soviet war. The Taliban allowed Bin Laden to build a number of training camps for more than 5,000 men, in response he provided financial support to the Taliban which reached about 100 million dollar in cash and gifts. By late 2000, it was discovered that Bin Laden provided Taliban with his own troops to defeat the Northern Alliance led by Ahmed Shah Massoud. From 1996 to 2001 the Al Qaeda of Osama Bin Laden became a state within the Taliban state. He sent Arab recruits to join the fight against the United Front. Nearly 45,000 Pakistani, Taliban and Al Qaeda soldiers fought against the forces of Massoud (Shaffer 287).

After the 1996 attacks of Osama Bin Laden against the US military barracks in Khobar (Saudi Arabia), the USA started secret operations to track Bin Laden and the other Al Qaeda leadership. After the August 1998 attacks on two US embassies in east Africa, it was clear that the Taliban was providing safe haven for Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Attempts by the Clinton administration to force the Taliban to extradite Bin Laden failed and limited military operations were authorized. As a result, Cruise missile attacks were launched against Al Qaeda training camps, but Bin Laden himself escaped injury. Again, in October 2000 he was linked to the attack on the USS Cole, but the USA took no strong measures to deal with him. Key personnel in the Clinton administration could not reach agreement on the use of military actions after the attack. Bin Laden continued to provide financial support for the Taliban with an estimated 184 million dollar for the year before September 2001 (Burrough 16-17).
After George W. Bush was elected President in 2000, no concerted effort was made to deal with the threat imposed by Bin Laden and Al Qaeda until after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Again, US Strategy and policy toward Afghanistan was focused on outside influences rather than the entire context of Afghanistan itself (17).

II.2. Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 Attacks

Throughout 2001, and before the September 11, 2001 attacks, Bush Administration policy differed little from Clinton Administration policy which applied economic and political pressure on Taliban, but did not use the military assistance in the Northern Alliance. After the end of Clinton Administration policy, the Bush Administration increased engagement with Pakistan to try to reduce its support for the Taliban. At that time, there were rumors that Pakistani advisers were helping the Taliban in their fight against the Northern Alliance. In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State Department ordered the Taliban representative office in New York to be closed. In March 2001, Administration officials received a Taliban representative to discuss issues between them (Katzman 7).

Therefore, before the September 11 attacks, the administration had continued a similar approach in dealing with Afghanistan as taken by the Clinton administration: continued requests for the Taliban to turn Bin Laden over to the USA because he committed terrorist activities.
III. Post September 11 Attacks Period (2001-2009)

III.1. September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom

According to Almond and others in their book "Comparative Politics Today: a World View":

At 8:45 a.m, a hijacked American Airlines Boeing 767 was flown into the North tower of the World Trade Center in New York City, setting it on fire. At 9:03 am, a hijacked Airlines Boeing 767 was flown into the Center’s south tower, setting it on fire. At 9:43 a.m, a hijacked American Airlines Boeing 757 was flown into the west side of the Pentagon outside Washington, and at 10:10 a.m a hijacked United Airlines Boeing 757 crashed in a rural area near Pittsburgh. At 10:05 a.m. the Trade Center’s south tower collapsed from the top down, followed at 10:28 a.m. by the north tower. As a result, the deaths totaled about 3000. (714)

III.1.1. The Global War on Terror

The Bush doctrine immediately declared a “War on terrorism” as a response to the September 11, 2001 attacks. After that event, Bush declared that "we will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.” This policy was used to justify the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 (Lagayatte 214).

As a result of September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States of America and other coalition countries began a concerted effort to fight against international terrorism, primarily represented by Osama Bin Laden. He was placed on the FBI's "Ten Most Wanted List" with a 5 million dollar reward for information leading to his arrest. After September
11, 2001 attacks, the US government requested that the Taliban government of Afghanistan turn over bin Laden, the international terrorist who had planned the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon (214).

After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to use the military power to overthrow the Taliban when it refused to extradite Bin Laden. It proposed the necessity of forming a friendly regime in Kabul to enable US forces to search for Al Qaeda activists there (Katzman 8).

When the Taliban refused to extradite Bin Laden, a US-led coalition was formed and after six weeks of aerial bombardments and military action the Taliban was forced to leave power on November 17, 2001. However, Osama Bin Laden escaped (Barracks 24).

The terrorist attacks on the United State of America in September 2001 altered the US foreign policy towards Afghanistan dramatically. US security interests in Afghanistan became the main priority because the attacks were linked to the Al Qaeda organization and its camps in Afghanistan. The USA moved to establish a new policy towards Afghanistan and launched attacks on Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The military campaign to remove the Taliban regime took less than three months (Burrough 17-18).

The new Bush administration had been in the process of reassessing counterterrorism policy when the September 11 attacks occurred. By the end of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration had a new policy that fought against terrorists and those countries that harbor them. With the Taliban leaders’ refusal to extradite Osama Bin Laden after the attacks on the American Embassies in Africa in 1998 and the USS Cole in October 2000, as well as the financial support from Bin Laden for protection and his use of terrorist training camps, Taliban regime was accused of protecting Osama Bin Laden after the
September 11 attacks. Bush repeated US demands to the Taliban in a 20 September 2001 address to the joint session of Congress and the American people. The Taliban still showed no signs of being willing to surrender Bin Laden issue, so the only solution was the military action. The Bush administration started a broad effort to establish a coalition for a new war on terror (18-19).

At the time of the terrorist attacks on America, there were no military plans for operations in Afghanistan. Military planning began after the September 11 attacks for what would come to be known as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

III.1.2. Fighting Terrorism: Operation Enduring Freedom

Operation Enduring Freedom is the name given to US combat operations against terrorism in Afghanistan. It began on October 7, 2001. The primary purpose for Operation Enduring Freedom is to seek out Osama Bin Laden, who had been given shelter by the Taliban, and to destroy Al Qaeda. A second purpose is to seek and destroy Taliban and anti-government forces operating in Afghanistan. Also, another important reason is to establish the stability that is necessary to reconstruct Afghanistan politically, economically, and socially (Barracks 27).

By 20 September, the CIA officers moved first to reestablish relations with anti-Taliban Mujahideen leaders from the Northern Alliance who had been fighting against the Taliban. The USA established a military coalition and started OEF on 7 October with air strikes on military targets in Afghanistan. To balance the use of force, the Bush administration started humanitarian relief efforts. By 19 October, Army Special Operation Forces (SOF) linked up with the CIA and Northern Alliance forces. Other SOF units joined with anti-Taliban forces in Central and Southern Afghanistan (19-20).
By 10 November, the Northern Alliance and coalition forces had taken Mazar-e-Sharif in the north and by 13 November had pushed the Taliban out of Kabul. Additional SOF of American forces joined with other anti-Taliban forces in the South (Southern Alliance) and by 7 December had pushed the Taliban out of Kandahar.

The Taliban and Al Qaeda forces made one last major stand in the Tora Bora Mountains of Eastern Afghanistan. US combat forces conducted Operation Anaconda from 2 to 19 March 2002 and defeated the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. The remaining Taliban and Al Qaeda forces had hidden in the mountains of Afghanistan or escaped into Pakistan. Neither Osama Bin Laden nor the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, were captured or killed. Operation Anaconda was considered as the last major military operation but minor operations continued throughout 2002-2003 and it was not until May 2003 that Defense Secretary Rumsfeld declared an end of major combat operations. Fighting decreased from 2003 through 2005, but the Taliban re-emerged in 2006.

III.2. US Nation Building Strategy towards Afghanistan

III.2.1. Nation-State Building Strategy

State-Building is the process of creating or developing governmental institutions needed in order to stabilize and develop a nation-state. These institutions include political, economic, security, and democratic governmental agencies/institutions. Nation-building is the process of creating or developing a national identity, national values, and national-traditions. These are established by the creation of a national anthem, flag, language, religion, recognized ethnic and religious groups, and standardized public services designed to help address social and cultural issues in a nation-state.
The term “Nation-Building” has various meanings depending upon the context of its use. For the purpose of this paper, Nation-Building refers to activities aimed at securing long-term stability in a country after war or conflict. These activities include establishment (or reestablishment) of democratic government and national institutions (police, military, etc.), revitalization of the economy, and physical reconstruction.

Following the removal of the Taliban regime in 2001, the United States of America started a concerted Nation-Building effort in Afghanistan to ensure it never reverts to a terrorist sanctuary. In his thesis “Retooling the Nation-Building Strategy in Afghanistan” Dreyer said that the President’s National Security Strategy (NSS) specifically mentions Afghanistan:

As we pursue the terrorists in Afghanistan, we will continue to work with international organizations . . . as well as non governmental organizations, and other countries to provide the humanitarian, political, economic, and security assistance necessary to rebuild Afghanistan so that it will never again . . . provide a haven for terrorists. (Dreyer 2)

The process of political and economic reconstruction in Afghanistan has involved a broad multinational coalition coordinated by the United Nations and supported by donor agencies and many nations. After the fall of the Taliban, the United States and the international community developed the common goals of helping Afghanistan:

• reestablish a viable self-governing state structure reflecting the will of the Afghan people
• secure the country’s borders, maintain domestic peace, and deprive terrorists of a haven.
• stand on its feet economically and resume its traditional role as an interregional trade corridor
• protect the rights of women and minorities and eschew religious extremism
III.2.2. Bush Administration Strategy of Nation Building in Afghanistan

III.2.2.1. Post-Taliban Political Transition

After the Taliban had been forced to leave from Kandahar and the Southern Alliance had moved into the city, efforts were started to establish an Interim Afghan Government. The USA had finally learned from its previous Afghan experiences not to leave the country in a “vacuum”. The Bush administration’s promise that he will not use combat troops for peacekeeping or Nation Building had been revised to allow establishment of a viable Interim Afghan Government. With Coalition troops in control of the country, the UN Security Resolution 1378, which had been adopted in November 2001, described the UN role in establishing the Afghan Transitional Government (Burrough 20-21).

With the Taliban defeated militarily, the UN started an effort to include all the major Afghan ethnic and religious factions and the former King, at a conference in Bonn, Germany in December 2001. The outcome of the meetings was the Bonn Agreement, signed on 5 December, which established the Interim Government under the new president Hamid Karzai and prepared for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help provide security to Karzai’s new government until the new government becomes stable. Karzai took office on 22 December as the president of the Interim Afghan Government. The coalition had defeated the Taliban, recaptured the country and with the help of the UN achieved regime change in just three months. Later, a loya jirga established a new constitution in November 2003. In November 2004, Hamid Karzai became the first elected President of Afghanistan. Parliamentary and provincial elections took place in September 2005 (21).
Until 2005, it appeared that everything was moving towards the goal of a stable, secure governed country, but over the last four years, the situation in Afghanistan has started to deteriorate. The U.S. goal of removing the Taliban government and destroying Al Qaeda safe shelter in Afghanistan had been accomplished. However, The Taliban have reemerged as an insurgency with the goal of removing foreign occupiers from the country. With the rise in the insurgency, increases in the opium economy, increases in civilian casualties resulting from Coalition air strikes, and inequality in economic development; some Afghans are beginning to ask whether they are indeed better off with their new government (21-22).

III.2.2.2. Security Sector Reform

The US government is pursuing several ways, in cooperation with the international community, to reconstitute and solidify Afghanistan’s future as a stable, peaceful, and self-sufficient nation, among them security sector reform.

Security sector reform refers to a concerted effort by the international community to share the burden of rebuilding Afghanistan’s basic security institutions. At a conference in Geneva in 2002, various nations agreed to assume the role of “lead donor” in the most critical tasks. The United States of America is responsible for creating an Afghan National Army (ANA); Germany is working to build a national police force; Italy is charged with judicial reform; Great Britain is leading the effort to combat opium cultivation; and Japan is responsible for the Disarmament, Demilitarization, and Reintegration (DDR) of the numerous militias still operating throughout the country. Officials of the United States of America see successful and capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as the means by which the United States and NATO would reduce their involvement in Afghanistan (Dreyer 3).
III.2.2.3. Extension of Government Influence via Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Extension of central government authority to the outlying provinces is another concern in America’s Strategy to re-build Afghanistan. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is the coalition’s primary means for addressing this goal. PRTs are “joint civilian-military organizations whose mission is to promote governance, security, and reconstruction throughout the country. Comprised of a strong military contingent and interagency representatives from the sponsoring country, as well as an Afghan government official, these teams are designed to “export” the stable environment currently provided by the United Nations mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul. the United States of America decided to deploy eight PRTs. The teams include 50–70 US military personnel along with diplomatic and economic assistance specialists. PRTs have been established in Kunduz, Bamian, and Gardez. The PRTs main purpose is to help in reconstruction through small projects. In 2007 some 17 PRTs led by Western civilian and military personnel were working to restore economic infrastructure and security in Afghanistan (Dreyer 5).

III.2.2.4. Economic Assistance

Economic assistance is the third major focus of US Strategy. Afghanistan was already one of the poorest nations in the world before it suffered through 23 years of conflict. The cost of creating government institutions and a functioning infrastructure (roads, hospitals, schools, Telecommunications networks, power grids, etc.) is staggering, so several donor conferences have been held to ask for funds. The Afghan government estimated the reconstruction bill to be as high as 27.5 billion dollar for 2002-2010. The United States of America is the largest contributor to this effort, providing over one-third of the 3.6 billion dollar pledged by the international community for 2004. However,
unfortunately, many countries have failed to follow through on their pledges, causing a significant shortage of funds for designated projects. Many of the designated projects have not met the stated goals. For example, only 85 schools of the planned 286 were built in 2004 (Dreyer 7).

The Bonn Conference, which focused on the political process in Afghanistan, was followed by the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan in Tokyo in January 2002. More than 4.5 billion dollar was pledged by the international community as reconstruction assistance for the coming three years. In another international conference on Afghanistan in Berlin in March–April 2004, the international community pledged a further sum of 8.2 billion dollar aid to the country until 2007. The flow of international assistance resulted in more than 25 percent annual ‘economic growth’ in the first year after the removal of the Taliban and about 16 percent in the second year. The growth is estimated to continue at a rate of 10 to 12 percent in coming years. This aid and growth have hardly touched the lives of the majority of Afghans. However, many argued that economic growth has done little to reduce inequality in income, gender or geography. Afghanistan still ranks towards the bottom of a list of 177 countries in Human Development Index (HDI), Gender related Development Index (GDI) and Human Poverty Index (HPI). It has the worst education system in the world with one of the lowest adult literacy rates. Life expectancy in Afghanistan is at least 20 years lower than its neighbors; and infant and child mortality rates are among the highest in the world. Since 2001, Economic improvement which included the recovery of the agriculture sector, and the large growth in the services sector, has been based on large international aid. The London Conference on Afghanistan of 2006 promised to give about 10.4 billion dollar for economic infrastructure reconstruction during the following three years. In 2008, President Hamid Karzai announced a new five-year National Development Strategy, which included
economic and social Strategies, and was supported by 50 billion dollar of foreign funds. Many countries at the International Conference supported Afghanistan and provided 21 billion dollar for this program (Lafraie 126).

III.2.2.5. Narcotic Drugs as an Impediment

Narcotic drugs production is a major problem in Afghanistan seriously affecting the Nation-Building efforts. The International Narcotic Control Board Report for 2004 noted that, ‘Widespread cultivation of opium poppy have transformed Afghanistan into a country in which the economy, the culture and the political life are dominated by the illicit drug trade, which is threatening reconstruction efforts and undermining legitimate economic activities and the establishment of the rule of law’. According to the report, opium production reached an unprecedented level of 4,200 tons in 2004, jumping from an already near record level of 3,600 tons in 2003; and the area under poppy cultivation rose from 80,000 hectares in 2003 to over 130,000 hectares in 2004.

Until March 2005, the modest anti-narcotic campaigns carried out by the USA and British civilian authorities have worsened the drug problem, instead of solving it, because of their lack of a well-planned and coordinated Strategy (Lafraie 127).

III.2.3. Obama Strategy of Nation Building in Afghanistan

III.2.3.1. Major Governance Issues

Obama Administration policy, which articulated in the Strategy Reviews in 2009 as well as in State Department January 2010 document entitled Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, emphasizes expanding and improving Afghan governance as a long-term means of stabilizing Afghanistan. Then, the December 16, 2010 summary of
the late 2010 Administration Policy Review on Afghanistan included that “The United States must support Afghanistan’s efforts to better improve national and sub-national governance, and to build institutions with increased transparency and accountability to reduce corruption in order to sustain the Afghan government” (Katzman 11).

US policy has been to expand governance throughout the country. The policy was based on giving U.S. financial and advice under the Obama Administration to the Afghan government. During 2002-2006, the central government was strengthened by helping Karzai regional strongmen and local militias in order to achieve governance strategy (Katzman 11).

- Anti-Corruption Efforts

U.S. officials believe that widespread corruption in the Afghan government is weakening U.S. domestic support for the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. Therefore, The united States of America made a pressure on Karzai to get rid of governmental corruption. One conclusion of the Administration in 2010 was to focus on lower level corruption rather than investigations of senior Afghans or Afghans close to President Karzai (Katzman 12).

- Enhancing Local Governance

The United States of America attempted to promote local governance because building the central government has gone slowly and because official corruption is widespread. US policy has tried to use local governance efforts to support US Security Strategy for Afghanistan. Nawa, in Helmand Province, and Baraki-Barak, in Lowgar province became “models” of district security and governance and both got rid of Taliban militants in 2009. With large U.S. development funds that put sometime insurgents to work on projects , these districts became more stable and secure than they were in 2009.
“Operation Moshtarek” (Operation Together) which had been started in February 13, 2010, to clear the city of Marjah of militants, had sought to make Marjah a similar model. A US civilian representative for Southern Afghanistan, Henry Ensher, said in January 2011 that local governance efforts are expanding as districts have been secured by the 2010 US troops increase in Afghanistan (Katzman 12).

- **Human Rights and Democracy**

  The Administration and Afghan government claim progress in building a democratic Afghanistan that acts according to international standards of human rights practices. The State Department report on human rights practices for 2009 said that Afghanistan’s human rights record remained “poor,” noting in particular that the government or its agents commit illegal killings (Katzman 13).

- **Narcotics Trafficking/Insurgent Financing**

  Narcotics trafficking is regarded the obstacle to the US mission in Afghanistan because it weakens the rule of law and provides funds to the insurgents. The trafficking provides from 70 to 100 million dollar per year for the Taliban. As a result, The Obama Administration approach focused on promoting legitimate agricultural alternatives to poppy growing. In conjunction, the Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as “Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan”, announced in July 2009 that the United States would end its previous focus on destruction of poppy fields. In this view, eradication was driving Afghans into the arms of the Taliban as protectors of their ability to earn a living. Congress sided with Karzai’s view; the Successive annual appropriations laws since FY2008 have prohibited U.S. counter-narcotics funding from being used for aerial spraying on Afghanistan poppy fields without Afghan agreement. Other policies promote
incentives; Helmand, for example, received about 10 million dollar in Good Performance funding in 2009 for a 33% cut in poppy cultivation that year (Kataman 13).

How to use US and NATO forces to combat narcotics has been under constant debate. The U.S. military is flying Afghan and U.S. counter-narcotics agents Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) on missions and identifying targets; it also evacuates casualties from counter-drug operations and assists an Afghan helicopter squadron to move Afghan counter-narcotics forces around the country. To help break up narcotics trafficking networks, the DEA presence in Afghanistan has expanded from 13 agents in 2008 to over 80 by the end of 2010, with additional agents in Pakistan (13-14).

The late Ambassador Holbrooke also placed additional focus on the other sources of Taliban funding, including continued donations from wealthy residents of the Persian Gulf. He has established a multinational task force to combat Taliban financing generally, not limited to narcotics, and U.S. officials are emphasizing with Persian Gulf counterparts the need for cooperation (14).

III.2.4. Current US Nation Building Operations in Afghanistan

The Obama Administration’s “A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan” resembles the Bush Administration’s policy towards Afghanistan. The similar administration policies include the objectives of defeating terrorists, establishing an effective Afghan government; develop an Afghan security force, and establishing an Afghan economy. The Obama administration has increased U.S. troops on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border where they have worked to capture or kill members of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Osama Bin Laden (Tindall 21-22).
The Obama administration, like the Bush administration, has also continued the practice of utilizing military contractors in the training and counterinsurgency efforts in the state. One difference in the new administration is that it has worked to provide Nation State Building operations outside of the Kabul region. Through these additional military contractors and the support of foreign allies it has sought to address issues such as governance building through the provincial governments, increase NGO efforts, and the further elimination of narcotics (22).

Defeating Al Qaeda and the Taliban are currently the justifications used by the U.S. in response to the occupation of Afghanistan and for maintaining a military presence in the country for years to come. In order to defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the USA and its allies have been working to build and or rebuild Afghan institutions and structures in support of US efforts and in support of the needs of the local Afghan people. This building effort is a typical response used by foreign interventionist in order to help get rid of instability and to provide better opportunities for a sustained decreases in violence. For the last decade, the USA and allied nations have been working to develop Afghanistan’s state structures in order to stabilize the state from internal and external threats and security concerns, and to help provide basic human services to the Afghan people (23).

In Afghanistan, the current US Strategy seeks to weaken Taliban insurgents in the field; provide security training and assistance for the Afghan people to defend themselves; and assist the Afghan government in providing basic services to deprive the insurgency of popular support and create conditions for sustainable security when NATO forces leave. President Obama has invested in a military surge with an increase in civilian resources. For the first time, US forces have targeted the strongholds of the insurgency in Southern Afghanistan with major operations. To degrade the Taliban, the United States of America
has expanded conventional operations, greatly enhanced Special Forces activities targeting mid-grade Taliban leaders, and improved intelligence collection. The US military has committed to strengthen the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) as well as local community. Through the end of 2010, the United States of America has provided over 54.5 billion dollar in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about 30 billion dollar has been to equip and train Afghan forces. It has begun to set conditions for political settlements at the grassroots level by encouraging reintegration of Taliban fighters who give up the insurgency. At the major levels, it has supported reconciliation with Taliban leaders if they meet necessary conditions.

On the civilian front, the United States of America is working with local and national Afghan officials to reduce corruption and make the government more responsive to the needs of the people. Washington has made a series of attempts to secure the full cooperation of President Karzai and his government. Other US assistance, especially in the agricultural sector, has been devoted to enhancing economic opportunities so that Afghans have alternatives to insurgency and illicit activities, such as the narcotics trade (Council on Foreign Relations 10).

Since the beginning of his presidency, President Obama has conducted two major strategic reviews for Afghanistan. These reviews included a plan intended to disrupt, destroy, and defeat Al-Qaeda and allied groups in the region, and to prevent both Afghanistan and Pakistan from providing safe havens to international terrorists in the future. President Obama announced major new deployments of troops, and civilian officials.

The Obama administration’s Strategy for Afghanistan may manage to turn the tide against the Taliban insurgency and reduce the risks of international terrorism. It holds out
the prospect of building a stable Afghanistan without permanent US or international security forces. However, these desirable outcomes will be difficult to achieve, even with the additional resources at hand. Washington’s Afghanistan Strategy will demand great sacrifices and will ultimately rise or fall on whether Afghanistan’s people and leaders line up behind it (Council on Foreign Relations 40).

Starting in spring 2009, Washington’s Strategy has been supported by an increase US forces to a total of one hundred thousand in late summer 2010. Over a similar time frame, US Special Operations Forces have tripled their capacity. A primary mission for NATO is to train Afghanistan’s national army and police. The United States of America has spent more than 26 billion dollar to build the ANSF, and current plans would require 6 billion dollar per year through 2015. In July 2010, as part of a short-term effort to expand anti-Taliban forces, NATO convinced the Kabul government to permit the equipping, training, and organization of community defense forces under the authority of the interior ministry.

Since January 2009, the overall US civilian presence has tripled to one thousand, while deployments outside Kabul have quadrupled. The Obama administration has refocused economic assistance (more than 2.6 billion dollar during the 2009–2010 fiscal year) to the agricultural sector, on which approximately 80 percent of Afghans rely for their livelihoods. Concerning the counter narcotics policy, the Obama administration has emphasized interdiction and “alternative livelihoods” programs aimed at targeting kingpins without angering farmers. The new approach is supported by an increase in U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration personnel and material, as well as technical assistance to farmers (Council on Foreign Relations 41).

Even as these major new commitments have been announced, President Obama has also pledged that the increased U.S. military commitment will not be open-ended. The
United States will begin to transition lead responsibility for security to Afghan forces in July 2011, although the specific pace of that process will be determined by conditions on the ground in Afghanistan. At the July 2010 Kabul conference, the parties expressed support for President Karzai’s objective that the ANSF “should lead and conduct military operations in all provinces by the end of 2014.” (Council on Foreign Relations 41).

The geographic focus of the recent American troops increase is in Afghanistan’s Pashtun South, the birthplace and stronghold of the Taliban movement. In NATO’s spring 2010 drive to secure the Helmand River valley, Taliban fighters were forced out from their shelter in the district of Marjah, and new local officials were installed. At the same time, the United States has also had some successes with its approach, including in Nawa where Taliban fighters have been displaced, conditions are secure, and US development programs are taking hold (41-42).

NATO’s effort to secure Kandahar has also proved difficult. Facing a calculated assassination campaign by the Taliban, ISAF commanders have limited military activity inside Kandahar and have focused on outlying districts. There they have deployed additional troops, often partnered with Afghan national security forces (42).

On the political front, the Obama administration’s relations with President Karzai have been difficult and subject to public disagreement. They reached a low point in the fall of 2009, during and after Afghanistan’s presidential election. Karzai’s visit to Washington in May 2010 focused on improving relations with the Kabul government, an effort that has carried on in subsequent senior dialogues. Over the summer of 2010, Washington sparred with Karzai over anticorruption efforts and his decision to ban private security contractors from Afghanistan. Perhaps the most contested political issue in Afghanistan in recent months has been the reconciliation process. Distinct from the long-standing goal of
reintegrating Taliban soldiers and junior commanders into Afghan society, reconciliation is focused on more senior Taliban members and has raised sensitive questions about what concessions the Afghan government and international community should be willing to make, what redlines they should draw, and the extent to which negotiations offer a realistic prospect for bringing the war to a close (Council on Foreign Relations 42-43).

III.2.4.1. Challenges of Current US Nation Building Strategy in Afghanistan

The Obama administration decision of 2009 to devote greater military and civilian resources to the Afghan war has been completed over the course of an extremely challenging year. Political and military setbacks have raised questions of whether the United States has the capacity to achieve its core goals with the present Strategy. The following important policy challenges must be addressed in order to improve prospects for progress. If timely progress is not achieved, a more fundamental reassessment of U.S. strategy will be warranted (Council on Foreign Relations 43).

- **Political weakness, corruption, and national division**: Washington needs Afghan political partners to succeed in their mission. The Afghan government remains weak. It is too often corrupt and predatory. Fundamental deficiencies of the Afghan political system divide the Afghan public and could prove fatal to US efforts. Disproportionate responsibility is vested in the presidency. This imbalance is seen in the weakness of the parliament, the lack of credible political parties, and presidential control over the appointments of unelected local government officials throughout the nation. Washington should seek to build the strength of local Afghan authorities as a means to reduce public grievances against the central government but not as a means to build alternative power centers that threaten national unity (Council on Foreign Relations 43).
• **Reconciliation:** The present Karzai-led reconciliation process is insufficiently representative of the wide spectrum of Afghan interests. It is raising fears among many of these groups and spurring concerns throughout the region, particularly in India. The process requires greater U.S. guidance and regional consensus building (Council on Foreign Relations 43).

• **Assessing progress:** The next U.S. strategic review is slated to begin in December 2010. It should be a comprehensive assessment of whether the present Strategy is working. To accomplish this goal, the Obama administration will need criteria for assessing progress, along with 44 US Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan supporting data, or it will lose the confidence of the US Congress and the American public (Council on Foreign Relations 43-44).

• **Afghan National Security Forces:** In most instances, Afghan security forces—the army, police, and local community defense units—are not capable of taking the lead in the short term. The ANSF are being rapidly expanded at great cost, but a shortage of international trainers impedes their professionalization. Projections for future financial requirements are likely to face increasingly tough budget battles in the U.S. Congress (Council on Foreign Relations 44).

• **Economic growth:** Widespread poverty and lack of infrastructure threaten self-sustaining economic development. Without greater private investment and regional economic integration, Afghanistan’s vast resources, whether mineral deposits or agricultural products will remain underutilized, and the nation will depend on international donors to support its government and people (Council on Foreign Relations 44).
Conclusion

The efficacy of US Nation-State Building operations in Afghanistan has always been discussed since the first military intervention. The US Strategy of Nation Building in Afghanistan has focused on establishing security/military related institutions and services more than dealing with the country's economic, poverty, and unemployment related issues.

There are many that have criticized US Nation-State Building operations because it is largely focused on providing security while neglecting to engaging the indigenous Afghan people into the Nation-State Building operations process. There are also complaints that US efforts have not been effective in ceasing hostilities among and between the various tribes in Afghanistan. By focusing only on stabilizing a Nation-State Building through a military intervention, due to perceived national or international security threats, external actors will most likely leave this Nation Building Strategy in an even more unstable condition.
General Conclusion

The United States always looks at Afghanistan through the prism of its national security interests. In the aftermath of World War II, when the United States of America emerged as a superpower, Afghan leaders’ requests for economic and military assistance were declined by Washington. The United States of America saw more strategic significance in relations with Pakistan than with Afghanistan because of its own interests in the region. When the Soviet started assisting Afghanistan in the late 1950s and 1960s, the United States of America decided to provide some economic assistance too in order to avoid Afghanistan falling into the Soviet camp.

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, the United States of America applied the Strategy of Containment in Afghanistan in order to fight Communism. The Reagan administration took the opportunity to create for the ‘evil empire’ its own ‘Vietnam’. Therefore, from 1984 to 1989, the United States of America provided large amount of financial and military aid to the mujahideen. Withdrawal of the Red Army from Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War allowed for Washington the beginning of a new world order in which Afghanistan had played a little role.

With the loss of American interest in Afghanistan, and with a weak government in Kabul, Civil War in the country broke out which led to the Taliban domination in the second half of the 1990s. After the terrorist attacks on the American embassies in Africa in 1998, Afghanistan became the target of American cruise missiles and secret service operations. Then, the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon and the following declaration of ‘War on Terror’ in September, 2001 led to the American invasion of Afghanistan in order to secure or protect its domestic security as well as international security. Finally, after the American invasion of Afghanistan, the United States of America
followed the Strategy of Nation Building in order to destroy Taliban, rebuild the country within democratic principles and prevent Afghanistan to become a safe shelter for the terrorists again.

The US Strategy towards Afghanistan has taken some interesting shifts and changes throughout the past 60 years. These changes were based on various levels and interests within world conditions. However, the main objective of this Strategy is to defend the American interest and security and prevent countries from establishing a safe shelter for terrorists. Also, Afghanistan is still witnessing continuous conflicts and its problems are still unsolved.

However, this modest research does not mean the end of US Strategy towards Afghanistan because it raises new several questions that need further research particularly after Obama’s announcement that the American forces have killed Bin laden in Pakistan on 05/05/2011. Moreover, since the United States of America could soon destroy Taliban and their symbolic and religious leader Bin Laden, this raises new questions among them: will the United States of America withdraw its troops from Afghanistan? This is for sure, and Obama has a special plan for that especially with the advent of the American coming elections 2012.

Finally, we hope with the coming of Obama, America must withdraw its military troops and sets a civilian government where all the social categories and political forces live together in a national union and peacefully reconciled.
Glossary

Al Qaeda: (The Base) is the name of the network of Islamic extremists that Bin Laden has at his command to carry out his radical Islamic terrorism. It consists of a group of about 3,000 commanders and more than 200,000 Troops of Afghanis and Pakistanis. There are a number of terrorist centers, with numerous cells, in North America, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Albania, Kosovo, Algeria, Chechenya, all the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, the Philippines, Egypt, Ethiopia and Somalia.

Jihad: (Holy war) the word jihad means struggle in Arabic. This means a struggle between the forces of Allah (good) and the forces of evil --an eternal struggle. You have probably heard the word jihad in reference to Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. They consider the terrorism that they perpetuate a jihad.

loya Jirga: is a traditional "grand assembly" or “Great Council” in Afghanistan in which the Afghans appoint their leaders and adopt their political decision.

Madrassa: is a mosque school or religious Islamic schools which were established in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. Religious madrassas teach Islamic rules and produce literate Jihadi cadres.

Mujahideen: they were called the holy warriors. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Mujahideen were the most important group in Afghanistan that strongly fight and opposed the Soviets.

Northern Alliance: The Taliban’s policies caused different Afghan factions to ally with the ousted President Rabbani and Masud and their ally in the Herat area, Ismail Khan.
the Tajik core of the anti-Taliban opposition — into a broader “Northern Alliance.” In the Alliance were Uzbek, Hazara Shiite, and even some Pashtun Islamist factions.

**Pashtuns:** ethnic group lives in southern and eastern Afghanistan from Kabul to Zaranj which is on the border with Iran. Pashtuns also live in western Pakistan. They speak Pashtu and are Sunni Muslims.

**Shia: (Shi’ites, Shi’ia)** The basic divisiveness in Islam is based on an historical incident: After Muhammad died; there was confusion about who should succeed him as the leader of Islam. One group felt that the successor was Imam Ali who had been appointed by Muhammad according to Allah’s decree. Ali was a relative of Muhammad and the first to accept Islam. This group, mostly from the household of the prophet, was a minority and became known as the Shiites. They also believe that the leader of Islam must be endowed with grace and benevolence and should be infallible.

**Sunni Islam:** The Sunnah is the spoken words and acts of Muhammad. The Sunnah, Muhammad’s actual words and deeds, uses the life of Muhammad to explain and expand on the verses and teachings of the Qur’an. The Qur’an, the Sunnah, and the ahadith are the basic body of Islamic religious doctrine. The Sunni Muslims believe that Muhammad did not choose a specific successor and probably assumed that after his death, Muslims would find their own leader. The Sunnis chose a leader from outside Muhammad’s household. The Shi’ites refused to accept the Sunnis’ choice and split off from this main group.

**Tajiks:** ethnic group lives in a large area north and west of Kabul. Tajiks are also the principal inhabitants of the Republic of Tajikistan, a former region of the Soviet Union. They are primarily Sunni Muslims and speak the Tajik and Dari languages.
Wahabism: is a religious movement within Sunni Islam. It was developed by an 18th century Muslim theologian (Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab) from Najd, Saudi Arabia, who advocated purging Islam of "impurities". Wahhabism is the dominant form of Islam in Saudi Arabia. It has developed considerable influence in the Muslim world in part through Saudi funding of mosques, schools and social programs.
Works Cited


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